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 September 11, 2001 and conflicts that followed spurred a significant change in 
U.S. strategic defense policy, signaling a definitive end to Cold War era strategic 
thinking.  This paper explores these policy changes in the wake of 9/11 through the 
examination of three important defense-related elements: use and function of the reserve 
component, costs of defense and resource allocation, and strategic intelligence planning 
under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).   
For each of these elements, the author presents a comprehensive review of the 
existing literature surrounding the topic, followed by a case study comparing 
representative pre-9/11 policies with those that developed in the mid- to late-2000s.  The 
results of the three studies shed light on the effect 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan had on U.S. national defense policy and indicate how these effects will 
influence current and future defense policy.  Although the role of the United States in 
these combat missions has all but concluded, the events and lessons learned since 9/11 
will continue to shape U.S. defense policy, even in the face of new threats and strategic 
priorities. 
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 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 incited American outrage, prompted a 
worldwide backlash against Islamic extremism and terrorism, and served as the catalyst 
for American involvement in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The events of this day 
had far-reaching implications, effectively beginning a new era in U.S. national defense 
policy.  It was not obvious until a few years later, but the wars the United States fought 
and countermeasures taken against this new type of enemy required a marked shift in 
military strategic planning and defense policy.  Although the Cold War had ended more 
than a decade before 9/11, Cold War thinking still dominated U.S. national security 
policy at the time of the attacks.  The threat posed by terrorism and the wars the U.S. 
military fought in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded a new paradigm for national defense 
planning. 
 The strategic thinking that developed during the Cold War era continued to 
influence U.S. national security policy into the dawn of the 21
st
 century.  As a result, the 
U.S. defense establishment struggled to adapt to the new threat posed by terrorism and 
conflict outside the scope of conventional war.  During the Cold War and its immediate 
aftermath, the United States derived its military superiority from its vast arsenal of 
conventional capabilities.  These capabilities were vital to the U.S. policy of deterrence, 
and they allowed the American military to quickly and decisively defeat its enemies on a 
physical battlefield.  Consider Operation Desert Storm, a conflict that epitomized 
conventional warfare.  This conflict resulted in a relatively quick, clear American victory, 
primarily due to the superior military equipment and mastery of conventional military 
strategy and tactics brought to bear by the U.S. military.   
 2 
This military might played an important part in the bipolar system that 
characterized the Cold War, and with the fall of the Soviet Union, the superiority of U.S. 
military capabilities became unparalleled.  Enemies of the United States realized that they 
could not succeed in challenging the United States through conventional military means, 
so the nature of the threats to American national security began to evolve.  9/11 was the 
prime example of this evolution, and it proved to have significant effects on defense 
spending, personnel, and even intelligence. 
The overarching theme of this paper focuses on the post-9/11 changes in U.S. 
strategic defense policy and planning considerations.  The United States has been 
embroiled in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for the better part of the 21
st
 century to 
date, resulting in significant shifts away from Cold War thinking and toward strategies 
and doctrine better suited to counter non-conventional, or asymmetric, threats.  Although 
the United States military has all but concluded its participation in these particular 
conflicts, the changes they brought about within the defense establishment will have 
persistent implications for U.S. strategic defense planning today and in the future, 
meriting a closer examination of the subject.   
This paper will cover three main areas in which the changes resulting from the 
shift in the nature of the threats the United States faces are particularly important and 
evident.  The first chapter discusses the use of reserve personnel, the second explores 
defense costs and resource allocation, and the third focuses on strategic intelligence 
planning.  By investigating significant changes that occurred in these areas between the 
Cold War era to today, one can better understand the most important considerations for 
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strategic defense planning in the current threat environment, both in times of war and 
times of peace. 
This work begins by focusing on a particular piece of the U.S. military that the 
events of 9/11 and the subsequent conflicts significantly affected – the reserve 
component.  The first chapter asks how the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the use 
of the U.S. reserve component, both in the short-term and long-term.  Considering the 
post-9/11 shift in U.S. military strategy and doctrine away from conventional warfare, the 
chapter draws attention to the contribution reservists made in areas such as 
counterinsurgency, as well as some of the challenges involved in mobilizing the reserve 
component during prolonged conflicts.  This chapter explains the doctrinal difference 
between the strategic reserve that was created after the Vietnam War and the operational 
reserve that serves in today’s military.  Comparing the benefits and challenges of 
deploying reservists in wars like in Iraq and Afghanistan with the strategic role for which 
they were intended allows for an assessment of the reserve component’s performance in 
the past 13 years, as well as an observation of the role reservists play in supporting 
today’s strategic defense policy.    
After exploring the background of relevant military doctrine and the use of 
reservists in Iraq and Afghanistan, the paper presents an analytical comparison of the 
envisioned role of the reserve component in military doctrine, the use of reservists in 
conventional conflicts, and their role in counterinsurgency missions during the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although they were initially intended to be a strategic force, the 
consistent deployment of reserve troops during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
demonstrates that reservists are undoubtedly now an operational reserve that will be 
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relied upon by the U.S. military in future conflicts.  Additionally, reservists were 
particularly well suited to counterinsurgency missions due in large part to the civilian 
skills they bring with them, and skill sets they bring to bear directly support current U.S. 
strategic defense priorities.  Thus, the paper concludes that even in an era of financial 
restraints across the DoD, reservists will continue to be key players to future conflicts and 
military operations of all kinds, in large part because of their unique skills and expertise.  
The second chapter of this paper examines how the broad shift from conventional 
to irregular warfare has affected the costs of U.S. national defense.  Since American 
capabilities for conventional war are far superior to any challengers, enemies have turned 
to asymmetric tactics and strategies; in other words, the focus of United States defense 
shifted away from conventional warfare toward irregular warfare.  Although the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded and waned, respectively, the majority of defense 
experts and scholars agree that irregular warfare will continue to be relevant to at least 
some degree in potential future conflicts.  Given this new reality, the paper identifies 
three primary characteristics of irregular warfare: stability and support operations, 
counterinsurgency missions, and reliance on Special Operations missions.  Using key 
elements associated with these three areas as a basis for analysis, the paper compares the 
1993 Bottom Up Review with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review to understand how 
costs were affected by this shift from a time when conventional warfare was the primary 
concern of the United States to an era in which irregular warfare demands equal attention 
in defense strategic planning. 
The comparison of the Bottom Up Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review 
focuses on the overall tones and themes of the documents, their analyses of future 
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military planning and requirements, and the recommendations for future defense 
spending and resource allocation within each.  Both reviews occurred following wars, at 
times when defense spending was experiencing a tightening of the proverbial belt.  The 
results of the comparison are interesting in that they both include maintenance of 
conventional capabilities, but the 2010 QDR includes more recommendations for 
equipment aligned with irregular warfare needs, and it advocates and emphasizes 
building and maintaining partnerships and international engagement for conflict 
resolution.  Despite these findings, however, the author notes that the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by which the QDR was most influenced were funded in large part by 
Congressional budgetary supplementals, so peacetime financial planning has not yet 
reflected the shift to irregular warfare.  Although there is little hard evidence thus far, 
long-term costs of defense will likely decrease with the shift to irregular warfare, because 
even in cases where the initial costs of irregular warfare capabilities are high, the long-
term costs are generally lower.  Thus, the chapter concludes, irregular warfare will 
require less funding to achieve U.S. strategic objectives, and will potentially reduce the 
cost of defense in the long run. 
The third chapter of this paper focuses on the intelligence facet of strategic 
defense policy, seeking to determine how the creation of the Director for National 
Intelligence (DNI) has affected strategic intelligence planning.  As evident thus far, the 
9/11 attacks significantly affected functions and long-term planning of the U.S. military, 
and these were paralleled by substantial changes in the U.S. intelligence apparatus.  In 
response to American public outcry, President Bush established the 9/11 Commission to 
investigate the 9/11 attacks, and out of the Commission’s findings and recommendations 
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evolved the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.  The 
intelligence reforms that resulted from IRTPA remain some of the most hotly contested 
issues among Washington insiders today, but the simple truth remains that strategic 
intelligence planning 13 years after 9/11 is decidedly different from that prior to the 
attacks.  One of the most obvious changes was the creation of the position of the DNI, 
and this chapter explores the most divisive views on the creation of this position and its 
performance to date.  Charged with overseeing the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the 
DNI naturally reflects the current U.S. strategic intelligence planning paradigm.   
Comparing the DNI’s mechanism for intelligence requirements prioritization (the 
National Intelligence Priorities Framework - NIPF) with its pre-DNI predecessor 
(Presidential Decision Directive 35 – PDD 35) serves as the basis for an analysis of the 
current strategic intelligence planning posture.  This analysis explores the strengths and 
weaknesses of both mechanisms, concluding that the NIPF is clearly a superior 
mechanism to that promulgated by PDD 35.  Given that the NIPF is the DNI’s sole 
mechanism for establishing intelligence priorities, this tool allows the DNI to exercise his 
responsibilities for oversight and management of the IC, ensuring that the highest priority 
intelligence issues are covered while maintaining flexibility to shift focus to unexpected 
issues, should they arise.  Scholars maintain different viewpoints on the performance of 
the DNI to date, and the fact remains that the creation of this office did not mirror the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.  Despite often-tepid evaluations, however, the 
DNI has positively affected strategic intelligence planning, at least to a degree, through 
the maintenance and use of the NIPF.   
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In order to fully explore the three topics outlined above, the author first examines 
the existing literature surrounding each topic, and then draws upon specific historical 
cases to provide a basis for addressing each research question.  This framework for 
analysis allows the argument of each chapter to support the overall theme of the thesis.  
Through examination of these three areas – use of the reserve component, budget 
planning and resource allocation, and strategic intelligence planning – this paper seeks to 
provide a thorough evaluation on how 9/11 has affected the American defense policy at 
the strategic level.  There is no doubt that the American defense establishment today 
looks significantly different from that in place on September 10, 2001, and many of the 
changes that occurred since then will continue to influence strategic defense planning, 
even as the U.S. military draws down from wartime levels and returns to peacetime 
status.  Understanding the specific factors that have contributed to the change in both 
structure and mindset, however, will allow policymakers to effectively plan for the future 
and be better prepared to avoid strategic surprise, such as that incurred by the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. 
In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. defense policy has adapted 
to consider and prepare for future threats.  Emerging threats outside the scope of Iraq and 
Afghanistan coupled with decreasing budgets and a restrained fiscal environment 
prompted a refocus in U.S. defense policy, which is set forth in President Barack 
Obama’s 2012 strategic defense priorities.  This policy shifts away from focusing 
primarily on Iraq and Afghanistan to promulgate other strategic considerations, including 
a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, engagement with allies and partners around 
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the globe, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
1
  
That said, the policy lists counter terrorism and irregular warfare as the first of the 
primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, indicating that these concepts will remain 
key components of U.S. defense policy, even as strategic priorities evolve.
2
  The broad 
lessons learned and shifts in defense policy resulting from over a decade of conflict in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are reflected elsewhere in the document as well.  Although the 
strategy indicates that some of these missions, such as counterinsurgency, will decrease 
with reductions in manpower, the underlying concepts that became entrenched in military 





                                                        
1
 United States, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Strategic Priorities for 21
st
 Century Defense, 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 2012: 1-3. 
2
 Ibid., 4. 
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The beginning of the 21st century has presented challenges to American national 
security that differ significantly from previous threats the United States faced.  The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed gave rise to a 
greater focus on elements of irregular warfare, including counterinsurgency missions.  As 
the United States maintained a primarily conventional warfare capability prior to 9/11, 
this shift toward non-conventional, or irregular warfare, greatly affected manning and 
personnel requirements within the Department of Defense (DoD).  Furthermore, the 
lessons learned and changes brought about during this most recent decade of war 
continue to be reflected in U.S. defense policy and future planning considerations.  
Focusing on a critical subset of the U.S. military force, this chapter explores what effects 
9/11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had on the function of the reserve 
component, and considers how these effects influenced the future role of reserve forces 
given current strategic defense policy.   
In the days immediately following 9/11, it was obvious that the United States 
would go to great lengths to retaliate against the perpetrators of the events and prevent 
future attacks, which resulted in wars on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These 
conflicts were unlike most of those the United States had fought previously, as the enemy 
was a non-state actor using asymmetric tactics against United States forces.  Although the 
United States military declared success in Iraq in 2003 after toppling Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, the conflict worsened after that time period, shifting to a counterinsurgency 
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nature and persisting for several years.  Although combat troops are slated for withdrawal 
by the end of 2014, U.S. troops have been consistently fighting in Afghanistan since late 
2001.  The personnel requirements and skill sets needed to fight these wars were different 
in some ways from those necessitated by previous conventional wars.  One of the most 
significant differences was the mobilization of a large number of reserve units to fight for 
years on end in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a consequence, the military extended reserve 
component deployment lengths in order to retain troop strength and skill sets necessary to 
successfully conduct counterinsurgency efforts both during the conflict and as operations 
drew down.   
In order to understand how 9/11 affected DoD’s use of the reserve component 
since 2001, this chapter will first explore the intended role of the reserve component in 
U.S. military doctrine prior to 9/11.  The author will then examine the various viewpoints 
on post-9/11 reserve mobilization and its involvement in counterinsurgency efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Following examination of the relevant concepts and schools of 
thought surrounding the use of the reserve component, the paper will conduct a case 
study on the use of reservists during the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and the 
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The chapter argues that reserve components are 
crucial to any conflict because of the expertise and skill sets they bring to bear, 
particularly for non-traditional missions such as counterinsurgency.  For this reason, 
although frequent and lengthy deployments pose challenges for the reserve component, 
this force will remain entrenched in strategic defense planning, even in peacetime or 
against unknown future threats.  
 
 11 
Reserve Component in Military Strategy and Doctrine 
 The reserve component of the U.S. military, which includes federal reserve troops 
along with state-based National Guard units, was integrated in the Total Force concept 
during the transition from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) following the 
Vietnam War.  Although reservists played a relatively minor role in the Vietnam War, 
under the Total Force construct, the reserve force was intended to be adequately prepared 
for quick mobilization to participate in contingency operations or small-scale conflicts.  
In the case of a significant conflict that the AVF could not handle on its own, the military 
could activate conscription through the Selective Service to achieve the troop strength 
needed to successfully fight a large-scale conventional conflict.  Under such 
circumstances, as Lawrence Korb and David Segal explain, the reserve component would 
serve as a “bridge to conscription,” providing adequate combat support while the 
conscripts underwent training for their role on the battlefield.
3
  
In the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the reserve force 
augmented active duty forces on the battlefield to form a significant portion of the troop 
numbers on the ground.  For example, in 2008, reservists formed 40-50% of the troops 
engaged in counterterrorism missions.
4
  The troop numbers required in Iraq and 
Afghanistan could be sufficiently filled by a combination of active duty and reserve 
troops, allowing policymakers to avoid discussion of the politically unpopular 
reinstatement of the draft.  These wars, however, placed excessive strain on reserve 
                                                        
3
 Lawrence J. Korb and David R. Segal, "Manning & Financing the Twenty-First- Century all-Volunteer 
Force," Daedalus 140, no. 3 (2011): 78. 
4
 Karin K. DeAngelis and David R. Segal,  “Building and Maintaining a Post-9/11 All-Volunteer Military 
Force,” in The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything, ed. Matthew J. 
Morgan, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009): 51. 
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troops, many of which had never dreamed they would serve back-to-back tours in Iraq 
when they joined the reserve force.   
 The attacks of 9/11 prompted an outburst of American patriotism and unity, and 
drove many to consider volunteering to serve either on active duty or in the reserves.  
What many of these volunteers and existing service members – particularly those in the 
reserves – could not predict, however, was the extended and frequent tours they would 
serve as part of their duty.  As Michael Musheno and Susan Ross observe, “Even 
reservists with considerable experience were shocked by the length of their deployments 
and time away from home.”
5
  Musheno and Ross conducted extensive interviews and 
observations of a particular Army reserve unit, and their conclusions indicate the stark 
difference between the intended use of reservists within the Total Force construct and the 
reliance on these troops in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In their words, “The nearly 
fifty years of the Reserve as the home of America’s weekend warriors has come to an 
abrupt end.  They are now the new conscripts of the twenty-first-century U.S. Army.”
6
  
This conflict solidified the movement of the reserve component away from the strategic 
role for which it had been designed toward that of an operational force. 
 
Strategic vs. Operational Reserve 
At its inception, the Reserve Component was designed to be strategic in nature, 
but there is little argument that it has become an operational force as it stands today.  The 
strategic function envisioned for the reserve components is illustrated by the  “bridge to 
conscription” idea mentioned above.  In completing their drills one weekend a month and 
                                                        
5
 Michael C. Musheno and Susan M. Ross, Deployed : How Reservists Bear the Burden of Iraq, (Ann 




two weeks a year, the reserve component troops would maintain their ability to 
participate in domestic contingency operations, such as natural disaster relief, or 
temporarily augment the active component in the event of a major conflict.  Under this 
construct, reservists would not fight alongside the active component in conflicts 
extending multiple years; rather the active component would draw upon conscripted 
soldiers to obtain the numbers of troops needed to fight a large-scale conflict.  In an 
operational role, however, reserve forces fight alongside the active forces for as long as 
the conflict lasts and serve in many of the same roles held by active duty troops.   
Given the continued use of reservists in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
more than a decade, the transition from a strategic to an operational reserve is obvious 
and, arguably, permanent.  American defense policymakers recognized the necessity of 
drawing from the reserves during a conflict after they neglected to do so in favor of 
building troop levels through conscription during the Vietnam War.  In the wake of the 
disastrous Vietnam War, policymakers abolished the draft and downsized the U.S. Army, 
and in doing so, “the Reserve Component became, at least conceptually, an ‘operational’ 
asset of the ‘Total Army.’”
7
  Most scholars, however, view the shift toward an 
operational reserve as a more recent occurrence, notably during the post-9/11 wars.  
Regardless of the exact moment of this transition, there is a broad consensus that the 
operational nature of today’s reserve component demands significant changes in 




                                                        
7
 Mark MacCarley, "The Reserve Component," Military Review 92, no.3 (2012): 39. 
8
 Michael Lynch and William Stover,  “A Turbulent Transition: The Army National Guard and Army 
Reserve’s Movement to an Operational Reserve,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 36, no. 2 
(2008): 68. 
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Major General Mark MacCarley explores the obstacles the military encountered 
when relying on the reserve component as an operational force during Operation Desert 
Storm and Operation Desert Shield, detailing the lack of operational readiness the 
reservists demonstrated when mobilized for combat.  To rectify these shortcomings, the 
military implemented new training regimens and force structure throughout the 1990s, 
and took further steps to meet the challenges of readying reserve troops after 9/11.  
MacCarley notes that the proper training and preparation has allowed Reserve 
Components to be truly “trained and ready” as part of an operational, rather than 
strategic, reserve in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
9
  Likewise, Korb and Segal 
acknowledge that although many reservists had joined to be part of the strategic reserves, 
in the post-9/11 era, they “had effectively become an operational expeditionary force.”
10
 
It is worth noting, however, that these scholars communicated their conclusions towards 
the end of the war in Iraq.  Observations from the beginning through the peak years of the 
war tended to focus on the lack of training and subpar or inefficient equipment for 
reserve personnel. 
In an article published in early 2008, Michael Lynch and William Stover highlight 
the difficulties the reserve component experienced in the early and middle years of the 
war in Iraq, during which time they were augmenting an already-strained active force.  
The reserve component faced frequent mobilizations and lengthy deployments, often with 
inadequate training and equipment.  According to the authors, “The National Guard and 
Reserves, once the United States’ grand strategic reserve, has been transformed into an 
operational force, continuously and extensively utilized with plans underway to continue 
                                                        
9
 MacCarley, “The Reserve Component,” 43. 
10




  A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study from a few 
years earlier foreshadowed this transformation and provided two reason for the 
equipment shortfalls at the time, the first being the Army’s resource allocation “based 
primarily on the assumption that they would deploy overseas only in the latter stages of 






The shift of the reserve component from a strategic to operational force was 
accompanied by several policy and legal complications.  Under U.S. federal law, reserve 
forces can be mobilized in three ways: full mobilization, partial mobilization, and 
presidential reserve call-up.  During the most recent conflicts, reservists were partially 
mobilized, which by law, means that the President can declare mobilizations lasting no 
longer than 24 consecutive months.
13
  As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued and 
troops became increasingly strained, however, confusion arose over the allowed 
mobilization lengths.  In contrast to the legal wording, DoD’s mobilization guidance 
stated that reservists could be mobilized for no longer than 24 cumulative months, rather 
than consecutive months.  Lynch and Stover quote General Lance Smith’s adroit 
observation of the implication of the term cumulative rather than consecutive: “…you’d 
                                                        
11
 Lynch and Stover, “A Turbulent Transition,” 82. 
12
 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve 
Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, by Janet A. St. Laurent, GAO-06-1109T, Washington, D.C.: GAO, 
2. 
13
 Ibid., 5. 
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be able to mobilize for 23 months, 29 days, demobilize them, and bring them back the 
following day and do it again.”
14
  
Another complicating legal factor regarding the mobilization and deployment of 
reservists arose with the DoD’s use of the Stop Loss program.  The Stop Loss program 
gives the President authority to involuntarily extend active duty enlisted service members 
beyond their established separation date and continue activated reservists on active duty 
through their scheduled mobilization during times of national crisis.
15
  The program was 
derived from a law implemented in 1984, and it was designed to ensure the military 
would be able to maintain adequate troop strength and expertise during times of a 
national conflict.  President George H.W. Bush delegated authority for this program to 
the Secretary of Defense in 1990, who delegated the authority to the Service Secretaries 
in 2001, where it has remained in the post-9/11 conflicts.  Stop Loss can be skill-based or 
unit-based, retaining service members with critical skills or units in their entirety, and it 
has been used primarily by the Army as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan persisted.  For 
reserve components, Stop Loss meant they could not separate from their units from the 
time the unit was mobilized until 90 days after demobilization.  Although Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates, issued guidance to minimize the use of Stop Loss, the Army 
estimated the program would be necessary through 2009, citing its necessity to “ensure 
that only trained and ready units were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.”
16
 
This disconnect between the laws regulating reservist mobilization, including 
Stop Loss, and the DoD guidance set the stage for significant debates and caused many 
                                                        
14
 Lynch and Stover, “A Turbulent Transition,” 69. 
15
 Charles A. Henning, U.S. Military Stop Loss Program: Key Questions and Answers, CRS Report R40121 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 10, 2009): 1. 
16
 Ibid., 6. 
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reservists to fear that they could effectively be mobilized almost indefinitely. Although 
General Smith’s comments indicate his belief that the DoD does not intend to do as such 
and follows a policy akin to Congress’ cumulative service lengths, Lynch and Stover 
illustrate the various defense policy makers’ differing interpretations of this law.  In their 
view, “… the new DoD policy is self-enforced, and the Pentagon can simply change that 
policy any time their leaders see fit.  Therefore, there is effectively no law that governs 




Consequences of Mobilization and Alternatives  
The use (or abuse, as scholars such as Musheno and Ross view it
18
) of reservists 
in Iraq has prompted calls for alternate courses of action.  Few reservists prior to 9/11 
could have foreseen the extent to which they would be required to serve, and this led to a 
great deal of personal, psychological, and institutional challenges during this time period.  
Musheno and Ross categorize the reservists they studied into three types: adaptive 
reservists, struggling reservists, and resistant reservists.  As indicated by the term, 
adaptive reservists, “adjust quickly, moving lockstep with changing institutional 
expectations as a result of a dynamic sense of their identity, and of relational networks 
that run deep at home and in the military.”
19
  Struggling reservists, on the other hand, are 
more prone to stress not only caused directly by serving in a war zone, but also from the 
often negative effect their military service has on their families and home lives.
20
  Finally, 
                                                        
17
 Lynch and Stover, “A Turbulent Transition,” 70. 
18
 Musheno and Ross, Deployed, 146. 
19
 Ibid., 7. 
20
 Ibid., 8. 
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resistant reservists “resent the interruption of their civilian routines, dismiss military life 
while they live it, and are more likely to oppose the war even as they fight in it.”
21
  
Although the personal situations of reservists vary by individual, the way they 
react to the challenges that accompany their roles as “citizen soldiers” generally falls 
within one of the three aforementioned categories.  Charles Moskos explores this idea on 
a more macro scale, looking at the trends among reservists in the middle of the Iraq War 
in 2005.  Moskos attributes the discontent among reservists to the perception of being 
“second-class members” compared to active duty troops, as well as lengthy tours of duty 
that are often extended, and stalled promotions.
22
  If not rectified, these negative factors 
could affect the number and quality of candidates electing to join the reserves in the 
future. 
Despite the recognition of the hardships reservists faced in the post-9/11 years, 
there is little consensus about what can be done to alleviate these difficulties.  A few 
experts have called for the reinstatement of the draft to end the reliance on reserve 
components in the event of a prolonged conflict (indeed, the supposed logic behind the 
Total Force construct).  Most scholars stop short of advocating this politically unpalatable 
option, however.  Musheno and Ross are vocal critics of the military’s overreliance on 
reserve units, and they portray their reserve case study subjects as conscripts to the 
military in an attempt to “awaken the public to their sacrifices and draw the attention of 
decision makers to halt the abuse of reservist call-ups to sustain protracted wars that are 
neither just nor in the interest of the United States.”
23
  Moskos sets forth a proposal for 
short-term active-duty enlistments, fulfilled by recent college graduates, as an alternate to 
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reservist mobilizations.  He advocates a 15-month active duty commitment during which 
time the enlistee would perform certain duties currently performed by reservists or active-
duty personnel, in exchange for tuition payment incentives.
24
 
Although many have expressed concern and even outrage at the current use of 
reserve components, it is unlikely that U.S. policymakers will make radical changes to 
the existing system, such as reinstating the draft or creating short-term active-duty 
enlistments.  Reserve units have proven their ability and worth in the course of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, solidifying their role in Total Force construct.  The mobilization 
and use of these troops will likely remain a subject of debate, but there is little doubt that 
reserve components will continue to play a key role as an operational force in future 
conflicts in which the United States becomes engaged. 
 
Reserve Forces and Counterinsurgency Efforts 
 At the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), American military commanders 
expected to quickly topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, turn over security operations to 
local police and military forces and withdraw in a timely manner.  They did not expect to 
become mired in a counterinsurgency that would span almost a decade.  Consequently, 
the first troops in Iraq were ill prepared to perform the functions associated with 
counterinsurgency operations.  For this reason and others, many of the required tasks for 
fighting a counterinsurgency fell to mobilized reserve troops.    
 Many of the counterinsurgency tasks and training guidelines were captured in a 
joint Army-Marine Corps field manual, FM 3-24.  A 2006 revision of this manual 
solidified counterinsurgency missions in U.S. military doctrine.  Although the impetus for 
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a substantive revision of this manual was the war in Iraq, the inclusion of the idea in 
current military doctrine reflects the importance military commanders placed in 
counterinsurgency, both short-term and long-term.  In other words, “the military’s leaders 
were projecting a ‘long war’ against Islamic extremists, which was likely to draw up on 
the same skills.”
25
  Despite the acknowledged prominence these types of operations 
would supposedly have in future conflicts, many scholars argue that the U.S. military did 
not prepare its troops sufficiently or draw upon the resources at its disposal to carry out 
counterinsurgency missions, including the civilian skill sets of the members of the 
reserve component.   
  U.S. military reservists have extremely diverse backgrounds and are employed in 
myriad positions in their civilian lives.  Many of these positions encompass skill sets that 
are directly applicable to counterinsurgency and reconstruction missions, such as 
economic development, rule of law, governance, agriculture, and law enforcement 
training.  One trio of senior Army officers has even called for an entirely civilian reserve 
corps, modeled after and comprising a branch of the National Guard, to be responsible for 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.  In the words of these officers, “Military 
commanders can set the conditions for stability and reconstruction by focusing on 
security tasks, but skills found at state and local levels of government or in the private 
sector are what rebuild societies and make permanent peace.”
26
 Recognizing that this 
recommendation for a civilian reserve corps requires a long-term policy change, the 
authors propose a short-term focus on utilizing the capabilities of the National Guard to 
develop state-to-province partnerships in Afghanistan and allowing more flexible civil 
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engagement teams to adapt to the particular needs of the area to which they are 
deployed.
27
  Along the same lines as this idea is the newly created Civilian Expeditionary 
Workforce (CEW) that will facilitate the deployment of civilian experts to “enhance 
DOD’s ability to work alongside and help build the capacity of partner defense 
ministries.”
28
  The CEW is still in its nascent stages, so military personnel, particularly 
reservists, continue to conduct a significant portion of the counterinsurgency tasks on the 
ground.   
Although somewhat similar to the idea of a civilian reserve corps in terms of 
getting civilians on the ground to perform missions outside the purview of conventional 
military operations, CEW draws from existing DoD personnel and has a global reach; it 
does not support only one particular conflict.  The civilian reserve corps as envisioned by 
Danner, et. al. would draw from non-DoD personnel during or in the wake of a crisis, just 
as the reserves do.  These personnel would concentrate on counterinsurgency and 
stabilization missions, and they would be qualified to do so based on their civilian 
expertise.  In the meantime, however, counterinsurgency and related non-combat efforts 
are a natural fit for reserve and National Guard forces because they can draw up on their 
various civilian skill sets for stability and reconstruction missions.  This is reflected in the 
Army Operating Concept, which states, “… the Army identifies Soldiers and leaders 
within the active Army and the Army Reserve component who possess unique skills, 
training, and experiences that could assist commanders until conditions permit other 
agencies to contribute.”
29
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As the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan nears, counterinsurgency missions 
performed by the U.S. military also wane.  One of the lessons learned from the post-9/11 
conflicts, however, is the key role the reserve component played in these types of 
missions and the broader conflicts due to their skill sets and expertise.  For this reason, 
reserve forces will undoubtedly be integrated into the force structure of future conflicts 
and operations, regardless of the specific nature of the mission.  The 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) reflects this in its discussion of adjusting the balance between 
active and reserve components as a subset of rebalancing the Joint Force, calling for the 
DoD to sustain capable reserve components.  Furthermore, the document indicates that, 
“As the [DoD] evolves its forces and capabilities, the Reserve Component will seek to 
recruit personnel with critical skill sets, retain highly experienced personnel, and 




Reserve Recruitment and Retention 
 The manpower intensive conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan posed challenges to 
every branch of service, particularly the Army and Marines, in recruiting and retaining 
qualified personnel while relying completely on an all-volunteer force.  Although there 
was a spike in patriotism and American unity immediately following 9/11, along with 
increased inquiries at recruiting offices, this did not translate to significantly higher 
enlistment numbers.
31
  The need to secure the necessary troop numbers compelled the 
U.S. military to lower its standards by granting more waivers and accepting under-
qualified troops.  According to Karin de Angelis and David Segal, “the demands 
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necessitated by the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq test the viability and effectiveness 
of today’s All-Volunteer Force in a manner never seen before.”
32
 Citing a decrease in 
both numbers and personnel quality, as well as a disproportionate representation of lower 
socioeconomic classes and minority recruits in the armed forces, these scholars convey 
the idea that the all-volunteer force has become stretched thin by the ongoing, manpower-
intensive conflicts abroad.  
 Another area of contention with regard to troop strength is what that strength 
should be, and to what extent reserve troops should be utilized.  Given the current 
financial woes, such as sequestration, that DoD and other government agencies face, 
many have called for a significant decrease in troop strength and other military-related 
spending.  This is a marked reversal of the cries for building military forces, both reserve 
and active duty, during the height of the war in Iraq.  Consider Michael Gordon’s 2006 
observation with regard to U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq: “To provide adequate 
resources for the new doctrine on counter-insurgency, maintain sufficient forces for 
dealing with unanticipated contingencies, and bring coherence to American defense 
strategy, the Pentagon needs to increase…ground forces.”
33
  This translated into an 
increase in active duty as well as higher mobilization rates for reserve components.   
The calls for troop increases waned, however, in the aftermath and drawdown 
period of these conflicts.  General Raymond T. Odierno, at the time Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army, advocated a decrease in the number of active duty soldiers as the Army 
transitioned away from these conflicts and the military purse strings tightened.  In the 
same article, however, he highlighted the integration between active duty and reserve 
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forces that resulted from the conflicts in the previous decade.  He observed that the 
reserve component was at its historical best, and he indicated that they would be 
deployed in future operations around the globe.
34
  Despite the current fiscal constraints 
and decreased troop strengths, the role of the reserve component that remains will 
continue its role in military operations, particularly those of a counterinsurgency nature.  
 
Case Study: Evolution of the Contemporary Reserve Forces 
In order to fully understand the current role of the reserve component and assess 
the implications for its future significance in strategic defense planning, this paper will 
consider three cases.  The first is the incorporation of the reserve component into the 
Total Force structure following the Vietnam War and the events and circumstances that 
led to this decision.  The second case examines the use of the reserve component in 
Operation Desert Storm, a conventional war, and the after-action evaluations of the 
performance and contributions of these troops during the conflict.  The third case focuses 
on the use of reservists in the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which represent 
asymmetric conflicts dominated by counterinsurgency missions.  Exploring the evolution 
of the reserve component over time and in various types of crises will facilitate an 
analysis of the challenges reservists face as well as the benefit they add to the overall 
American defense capability. 
 
Reserve Component in the Total Force Policy 
 The Total Force, designed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, came to be in 
1973 in response to pending defense cuts and abolition of the draft.  The policy 
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“advocated the integration of active-duty and reserve forces into a ‘total force,’ with 
reserve forces responsible for augmenting their active counterparts.”
35
  This concept 
directly resulted from the defeat the U.S. suffered in the Vietnam War, and it provided a 
new framework for American involvement in future conflicts.  
The incorporation of the reserve component in the Total Force policy was rooted 
in lessons learned from the Vietnam War.  Rather than mobilizing reserve forces to fight 
this war, President Lyndon B. Johnson opted to send conscripted soldiers to the front 
lines.  According to experts, his motivations for doing so were twofold and political.  
First of all, by instating the draft rather than activating reserve forces, Johnson better 
avoided alienating a significant portion of his supporters, which would incur “a much 
greater political impact than draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a 
deferment.”
36
 Secondly, by not activating reservists, Johnson hoped to “prosecute the war 
on a low-key basis, not really having to go to war big time.”
37
  Taking steps such as 
asking Congress to declare war or mobilizing the reserve force as the conflict escalated 
would fully acknowledge the U.S. involvement in the conflict and would allow for debate 
that could very well demonstrate a lack of public support for the war.  Because support 
for the war within Congress and the press was tenuous at best, opening this debate to the 
public was a situation that Johnson desperately sought to avoid because he knew his 
support base on the matter was limited.
38
  Given these factors, Johnson decided to avoid 
mobilizing the reserves, and instead relied on draftees to fight the war. 
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Of those reservists that did serve during the Vietnam War, most were relegated to 
non-combat roles, based on the idea that, “The possibility of ‘citizen soldiers’ being at the 
forefront of combat was thought to be an unnecessary and unacceptable vision.”
39
  About 
7000 reserve component forces eventually served in Vietnam, such as Air Guard units 
that flew combat and transport missions, but this number comprised only a fraction of the 
peak troop strength of over 500,000 servicemen on the ground in one year.
40
  As such few 
reservists saw action overseas during this war, the reserve component was regarded as a 
way to fulfill one’s military service obligation while generally avoiding combat.  
Reservists who had served before the war were often dismayed by the reputation the 
reserve component earned during the Vietnam War, a negative characterization that 
would persist in the years following the conflict.   
 President Johnson’s refusal to activate the reserves during the Vietnam had major 
implications for the planning and outcome of the war.  First of all, lacking trained and 
experienced reservists, the U.S. military faced a severe shortage of expertise and 
competent leadership essential to planning and executing combat missions.  In order to 
meet the numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) required to lead 
troops in combat, the Army was forced to decrease the length and lower the standards of 
military training.  As the war continued, the services faced even greater shortfalls, as 
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 Another drawback of Johnson’s decision related to American public support for 
the war.  By relying on draftees to fill the ranks of the military, Johnson lost the 
opportunity to earn support from communities across the Untied States that would likely 
have accompanied mobilization of local National Guard units.  One observer notes that, 
“as the war dragged on and casualties accumulated, support for the war waned, even in 
the communities that would have backed their Guard unit.”
42
  Thus, although one of 
Johnson’s primary goals was to avoid negative political backlash he thought would 
accompany reserve mobilization, he ultimately encountered exactly what he attempted to 
prevent. 
In the wake of the Vietnam War, defense policymakers sought to avoid the 
mistakes made in the events both before and during the war.  This meant creating an all-
volunteer force capable of fighting future conflicts such as the one in Vietnam.  One of 
the key players in this effort was Army Chief of Staff, Major Creighton W. Abrams, who, 
as Vice Chief of Staff during the Vietnam War, noted the negative implications of failing 
to mobilize the reserve component.  Consequently, Abrams redesigned the Army 
structure in 1973 in such a manner that the Army would be incapable of waging war 
without drawing upon the reserve component, a policy that appropriately became known 
as the Abrams Doctrine.
43
  Abrams explained the thinking behind this redesign, 
promising, “If the unfortunate circumstance should occur that, under some set of things, 
we would have to use the Army again, then we will use the active, the National Guard, 
and the Reserve together.”
44
  Thus, the Total Force policy established the basis for the 
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military as we know it today by ensuring that policymakers would draw upon existing 
expertise and leadership during future military engagements. 
 
Reserve Component in Operation Desert Storm 
 Although nearly two decades passed between the formulation of the Abrams 
Doctrine and the execution of Operation Desert Storm, this conflict marked the first 
major test for the Doctrine in practice.  At the beginning of the conflict, the Doctrine 
appeared to hold true to its intent.  President George H.W. Bush called for the 
mobilization of reservists; as a result, 97,484 reservists served on active duty in combat, 
combat support, or combat service support roles.
45
  These troops mobilized quickly, but 
upon reporting to their mobilization stations many exhibited a lack of training and 
qualifications necessary for deployment.  The combat support and combat service support 
units performed well after additional on-the-ground training and acclimation in Saudi 
Arabia, but many commanders refused to deploy units intended to augment active duty 
forces on the ground. 
 The challenges the reserve components that were intended to support combat 
brigades faced in their mobilization during Operation Desert Storm demonstrated one 
shortcoming of the Total Force policy – the potential for a lack of readiness for combat 
operations among reserve components.  In his commitment to ensuring reserve 
components would be incorporated in future combat operations, Abrams had promoted 
the “roundout” concept.  Under this idea, U.S. Army divisions with only two active 
combat brigades would be “rounded out” with a third reserve combat brigade during a 
war, thus ensuring that the reserve component remained entrenched in the Total Force 
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  Given its nature as a conventional war, Operation Desert Storm relied almost 
solely on the firepower and other combat capabilities of the services for success.  Thus, it 
was crucial for the roundout brigade to be on par with the capabilities of its partner active 
duty brigades.   
When this concept of roundout brigades was tested during Operation Desert 
Storm with the mobilization of three reserve combat brigades, however, it did not 
produce the intended results.  Major MacCarley cites as an example the 48
th
 Infantry 
Brigade of the Georgia National Guard that was designed to be one of these roundout 
brigades.  After six months of post-mobilization training, the Army refused to deploy the 
brigade to the conflict, deeming the unit unfit for combat operations.
47
  Another report 
cites the specific shortcomings endemic in these three reserve brigades, including lack of 
preparedness, poor quality of leadership, and lack of military discipline.  Although one 
brigade was eventually determined to be fit for combat, the conflict ended before the unit 
could be deployed, and the three brigades were demobilized soon afterwards.
48
  This 
situation prompted a review of the reserve components’ role in combat operations, as 
well as an effort to determine the factors underlying this lack of readiness. 
 One of the primary reasons the reserve combat brigades were unprepared to 
deploy during Operation Desert Storm was insufficient training and equipment.  Due to 
their reserve status, the roundout brigades were low priority for equipment allocations, 
which meant that they often trained with outdated or inadequate gear.  This contributed to 
their lack of operational readiness during Operation Desert Storm.  As a remedy to this 
problem, the Army implemented the “Bold Shift” strategy, designed to provide better 
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equipment, training, and integration between reserve and active components to those 
units designated for early deployment in the event of a conflict.  Assessments of this 
program in the years following its implementation, however, indicated that it did not 




 An alternative lesson drawn from the reserve combat brigade’s limitations in 
Operation Desert Storm centered on the type of mission for which they would be 
mobilized.  As Martin Binkin bluntly observes, “…round-out brigades should not be 
assigned missions that require their early deployment.  These units, under the best of 
circumstances, require a period of post-mobilization training of at least several months, 
and, more likely six to nine months.”
50
  Rather than designating entire brigades of reserve 
forces, Binkin advocates small roundout units that could maintain a higher level of 
peacetime readiness.  In sum, although the use of the reserve component in Operation 
Desert Storm was not entirely successful, the reserves were mobilized and did contribute 
to the combat support mission, thereby solidifying the Abrams Doctrine in American 
military strategy. 
 
Reserve Components in Post-9/11 Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan  
 The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks have 
been characterized by asymmetric or irregular warfare, rather than by conventional 
warfare that dominated during Operation Desert Storm.  As mentioned above, the reserve 
components of the U.S. military have played a significant role in these conflicts, lending 
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further credibility to the logic underlying the Abrams Doctrine.  Whereas Abrams 
envisioned reserve components incorporated into conventional force structure to augment 
Army divisions for combat, however, the role reservists have played in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has been much different due to the asymmetric nature of the conflict.   
 This paper has previously examined the inability of U.S. policymakers and 
military leaders to anticipate the length and counterinsurgency nature the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan would encompass.  As such, the nature of these conflicts placed unique 
demands on the reserve component.  In planning for combat in Iraq, military commanders 
mobilized reservists in order to provide adequate troop strength for the conflict in 
accordance with the Total Force concept and the Abrams Doctrine.  In fact, a New York 
Times article preceding combat operations in Iraq roughly equated the numbers of the 
reserve forces to be mobilized in the case of an attack on Iraq with those mobilized 
during the Persian Gulf War nearly a decade earlier.  Although the article recognizes that 
the post-9/11 role of reservists would differ from that in Operation Desert Storm, it 
attributes these differences to a need for homeland security and force protection missions 
in response to the threat posed by terrorism.  The actual “war plan,” the Times notes, 
would “probably call for fewer troops for a new offensive against Iraq than the Pentagon 
and allies deployed in the first gulf war.”
51
     
As the conflict in Iraq wore on, however, both reserve component and active duty 
troops became stretched thin in the face of a growing counterinsurgency mission that 
required large numbers of troops on the ground to be successful.  Theoretically, under the 
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design of the All-Volunteer Force, at this point the President and Congress would have 
activated the Selective Service in order the relieve the reserve troops, who would serve 
until the incoming conscripts received their basic training.
52
  Rather than reinstate the 
draft, a political impossibility in the early 21
st
 century, military leaders instead increased 
terms of service and deployment frequencies of both active duty and reserve troops 
serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in accordance with Stop Loss and the reserve 
mobilization policy. 
 Part of the reason for the reliance on reserve components centers on their civilian 
skill sets.  The nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly 
counterinsurgency missions, encompassed many tasks that fell outside the purview of 
traditional combat roles, and reservists were often best positioned to fill these roles by 
drawing upon their civilian expertise.  This is reflected in the composition of certain jobs 
within the military; for example, as of 2010, the reserve component comprised 87% of 
the Army’s Civil Affairs capacity and almost half of its military police and information 
operations groups.
53
  Retired Army General David Petraus who commanded troops in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan reiterated the importance of reservists’ civilian skill sets, 
observing that these conflicts necessitated “diplomats, builders, trainers, advisors, service 
providers, economic developers, and mediators” and that “citizen-soldiers have 
performed these diverse tasks in particularly impressive fashion, and in so doing, they 
have demonstrated the unique edge, the unique quality that they bring to every military 
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  According to the U.S. Army Reserve 2020 Vision and Strategy Statement, 
“Army Reserve forces are ideally supported for missions that improve infrastructure, 
security, and institutions within foreign nations.”
55
 These observations are indicative of 
the roles these reserve troops have filled, which vary greatly from those envisioned by the 
conventionally focused Abrams Doctrine. 
One of the biggest differences between reserve forces in Operation Desert Storm 
and those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan is the length of mobilization.  Operation Desert 
Storm lasted only a few months, barely enough time for reserve forces to complete their 
post-mobilization training.  Of all of the units mobilized during Operation Desert Storm, 
none served on active duty for longer than six months.
56
  Conversely, reserve component 
troops have been deployed continuously to Iraq and Afghanistan to support Operations 
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom since President Bush first authorized mobilization 
in September 2001.  In fact, 80% of all Army reservists and Guardsmen had deployed to 
Iraq or Afghanistan as of early 2007, and of those, 20% had been deployed more than 
once.
57
  The strain of repeated, lengthy deployments has severe implications for the well-
being of the force, both currently and in the future.   
As reserve deployment lengths and frequencies increased during the height of the 
war in Iraq, many reservists experienced severe hardships, either directly resulting from 
their military service or from the burden their service placed on their families, which 
prompted them to separate from the force at their earliest opportunity.
58
 There are signs, 
                                                        
54
 Jim Garamone, “Reserves Critical to U.S. Military Capabilities, Petraeus Says,” U.S. Department of 
Defense: News, January 30, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66979 
55
 Jack C. Stultz, “The United States Army Reserve 2020 Vision and Strategy Statement,” US Army 
Reserve, 2011, http://www.usar.army.mil/Documents/vision-and-strategy-2020.pdf, 2. 
56
 Korb and Segal, “Manning and Financing,” 78. 
57
 Ibid., 82. 
58
 Musheno and Ross, Deployed, 6. 
 34 
however, that the Bush administration recognized the negative impacts this burden could 
have on the reserve force and took steps to avoid the negative consequences that could 
result.  In 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates announced the implementation of extension 
pay and limited mobilization lengths to 12 months rather than the 16 or 24 months for 
which some reservists had previously been activated.
59
  This was a positive step toward 
relieving some of the stress on the reserve component, helping avoid the negative impacts 
that would result from depriving the military of a body of expertise and experience 
required for conducting essential missions such as counterinsurgency. 
 
Conclusion 
The role of the U.S. military reserve component has clearly changed since the 
inception of the Total Force policy in 1973, notably from a strategic function to an 
operational force.  As one article notes, “…the often derided ‘weekend warriors’ of 
yesteryear have been replaced by men and women who joined the Guard and Reserves 
knowing full well that they will participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military 
missions.”
60
  In the wake of the Vietnam War, U.S. policymakers learned the importance 
of activating the reserve component during a significant conflict, both to augment active 
duty troops with established military expertise and training and to better gain domestic 
public support for military involvement in overseas conflicts.  Operation Desert Storm 
confirmed the basis of the Abrams Doctrine, but also demonstrated one of its 
shortcomings; the roundout combat brigades were not ultimately used in combat due to 
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their lack of readiness and the short length of the conflict, but reservists played key roles 
in combat support and combat service support units.  
These observations reinforce the hypothesis that the reserve component is crucial 
to any conflict because of the expertise and skill sets reservists bring to bear, and it will 
remain entrenched in strategic defense planning, even in peacetime or against unknown 
future threats.  Having established the necessity of mobilizing reservists during a conflict, 
one must consider the way they have been utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past 
decade plus.  Reservists are a natural fit for missions such as counterinsurgency, due to 
their ability to draw upon their civilian skill sets to carry out tasks such as civil affairs, 
law enforcement, partner engagement, and so on.  Although reservists have indeed 
endured lengthy and extended mobilizations in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of the 
reserve mobilization policy and Stop Loss, it is now widely accepted that they are part of 
an operational force, rather than the strategic reserve of decades past. There have 
admittedly been problems with retention and recruitment as the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan wore on, but this understanding of the role of the reserve component in 
military conflicts will potentially offset losses in the future and minimize the number of 
“resistant reservists.”   
Reservists will continue to be critical to U.S. military operations, particularly 
those of a non-conventional nature, in which the United States will continue to engage in 
the 21
st
 century.  Many of these troops have civilian skill sets that are particularly suited 
for various tasks, and these skills must be better integrated into overall military doctrine.  
In fact, there are many experts that advocate increasing the use of reservists for non-
combat missions.  Policymakers must remain cognizant of maintaining this capability and 
 36 
they must be careful not to overextend it, but if they use reserve forces in the roles to 
which they are best suited, both the individuals and the overall U.S. military will benefit.  
Given the current budgetary constraints, DoD is reducing troop numbers across all 
services, including the reserve component.  The recently released 2014 QDR addresses 
U.S. defense priorities through the lens of fiscal austerity, and it recognizes the 
importance of the reserve component in upholding the strategic interests of the United 
States.  Reservists will uphold U.S. strategic interests, in this case “protecting the 
homeland, building security globally, and projecting power and winning decisively.”  
Moreover, the document states, “To meet future defense requirements, the [DoD] will 
sustain Reserve Components that are capable of providing trained units and personnel to 
augment and complement their Active Components when needed.”
61
    
In conclusion, the United States reserve components will continue to comprise a 
crucial capability of the Total Force construct, which should be reflected in strategic 
defense planning.  Regardless of the nature of future conflicts, the U.S. military must 
maintain an agile reserve component, and must draw upon the civilian expertise of these 
troops to augment active duty capabilities, as determined by the situation.  In this way, 
the military will be able to maintain a capable force in the most efficient way possible.  
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In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the United States military experienced a notable shift in military strategy 
and operations.  The kind of conflict the United States and its allies fought in these 
theaters of operation differed dramatically from previous U.S. military engagements, 
namely because the principal opponents were ideologically motivated non-state actors 
rather than other nation-states.  Consequently, the United States military had to adapt its 
military strategy and operations to effectively counter this new enemy.  This shift from 
conventional warfare, with which the United States has historically resolved most of its 
major conflicts, toward irregular warfare impacted doctrinal, operational, and financial 
considerations for U.S. national defense.   
Although doctrinal and operational factors are admittedly crucial, in an era where 
fiscal considerations dominate policymakers’ decisions, it is imperative to understand the 
costs associated with irregular warfare.   Wartime costs have dominated the U.S. defense 
budget since the paradigm shift from conventional to irregular warfare, however, so a 
long-term comparison of the overall cost-effectiveness of each is not yet possible.  
Accordingly, this paper will explore the following research question: How has the shift 
from conventional warfare toward irregular warfare in the past decade affected the costs 
of U.S. national defense?  The chapter will focus specifically on the allocation of 
resources and budget planning associated with U.S. national defense as well as the likely 
effect the shift will have on long-term defense costs.    
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In an effort to determine the relationship between the costs of U.S. defense and 
the shift to irregular warfare, this chapter will explore three factors of irregular warfare to 
explain the resources and costs associated with each.  The chapter first reviews the 
literature of the prevailing research and opinions regarding the three factors, focusing 
specifically on their required capabilities, equipment, and costs.  Examining the elements 
of these factors will lead to formulation and testing of a hypothesis detailing how the shift 
from conventional to irregular warfare affects the resource allocation and U.S. defense 
budget formulation.  Following the literature review, the chapter will detail a case study 
based on the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), of which the purpose of both is to make recommendations for defense planning 
and resource allocation.  The study will explore the hypothesis that the shift from 
conventional to irregular warfare decreases long-term costs of defense by altering the 
types of military equipment and resources allocated in defense budget planning. 
 
Conventional vs. Irregular Warfare  
There is little disagreement that U.S. national military strategy tilted in favor of 
irregular warfare vice conventional warfare in the decade plus of conflict in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Some U.S. defense experts debate the balance between conventional and 
irregular warfare capabilities and programs the United States should develop as a result.  
This is in large part due to disagreements over what path future wars will take, whether 
threats to the United States will come from state actors with large military arsenals or 
small, non-state actors using asymmetric tactics.  Michael Mellilo, for example, 
recognizes that interstate wars are less prevalent now because the United States has 
 39 
proven its conventional military superiority so enemies must use alternative methods if 
they hope to be successful in fighting against the United States.
62
  Phil Reynolds takes 
this view one step further in asserting that the types of conflict the United States has 
experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to persist in the international system 
while traditional “state-versus-state wars” will decrease.
63
  Regardless of their opinions 
on the matter, defense experts recognize that irregular warfare must be considered at least 
to some degree when planning for U.S. military operations and capabilities.  
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could not be fought strictly by conventional 
means due to their insurgency-centered and asymmetric nature, and the U.S. military 
adapted accordingly.  Although the military continued to maintain its conventional 
superiority, it also created and improved capabilities and strategies that better supported 
irregular warfare operations.  One example of this is the change in the U.S. Army’s force 
structure.  Prior to 2003, the Army was division-based, which allowed it to efficiently 
respond to conventional threats.  The Army has since evolved into a brigade-based 
expeditionary force, however, which positioned it to better conduct irregular warfare 
missions.
64
   
An increase in deployments of both active duty and reserve component troops was 
one of the main catalysts for this change in structure.  Budgetary supplementals and 
Overseas Contingency Operations funding that Congress repeatedly allocated for the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provided the financial means to make this change possible, 
asnd this discretionary spending was separate from the requirements of the annual 
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Department of Defense (DoD) budget.  This uptick in funding allowed the military to 
expend resources on establishing or expanding capabilities associated with irregular 
warfare while simultaneously maintaining the appropriated defense budget needed for 
conventional military capabilities.  Current budget constraints, however, may 
compromise the Army’s ability to fight both conventional and irregular wars by forcing 
the military to chose between capabilities and defense programs.
65
    
As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan draw to a close, there is much debate 
about what form future threats to the United States will take and how DoD should 
develop and maintain its forces and strategy.  While some scholars opine that the United 
States should prepare to confront the primary threat posed by rising state actors such as 
China by focusing on conventional warfare capabilities, most experts believe that many 
future conflicts will involve irregular warfare, thereby necessitating maintenance of the 
developments from the past decade.  Those that favor a focus on conventional capabilities 
argue that irregular warfare tactics, such as counterinsurgency, are expensive and difficult 
and that the United States needs to maintain conventional superiority in order to deter 
potential aggressors.
66
  The alternate view, promulgated by former U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, acknowledges that no one can predict the future, but argues that 
the United States should “hedge against uncertainty” by increasing and maintaining 
irregular warfare capabilities for potential conflicts similar to those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
67
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Both of these viewpoints present compelling arguments, but the prevailing 
opinion among scholars indicates that national defense policy must consider irregular 
warfare, at least to some extent.  This is substantiated in the recently released QDR, 
which identifies “rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflicts” as a key tenet of 
rebalancing the Joint Force for the 21
st
 century, one of the three initiatives the QDR 
advances.  As stated in the document, “Future conflicts could range from hybrid 
contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to high-end conflict 
against a state power armed with WMD or technologically advanced anti-access and area 
denial (A2/AD) capabilities.”
68
  Although not the only consideration, irregular warfare, 
indicated in this case by the terms “hybrid contingencies” and “asymmetric approaches,” 
is a significant influence on present-day defense policy and doctrine formulation, so this 
paper will consider how its factors affect resource allocation for national defense. 
 In order to understand implications the shift toward irregular warfare has for 
defense costs and budgets, one must examine factors that differentiate irregular from 
conventional warfare.  Although military and foreign policy scholars commonly use the 
term irregular warfare, its scope and definition vary by author.  LTC Bruce Floersheim 
begins by describing irregular warfare in very broad terms, falling “in the range between 
non-combat uses of the military… and major combat operations,” but he also notes that, 
according to the official military definition, “irregular warfare favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” 
69
  John A. Nagl 
and Brian M. Burton include stability operations and counterinsurgency as elements of 
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 as does Michael Melillo in his definition of “small wars,” which he 
acknowledges is a synonymous term for irregular warfare.
71
   
Almost every definition of irregular warfare, however, includes the following 
three factors: emphasis on stability and support operations on the ground, a 
counterinsurgency role for U.S. forces, and increased special operations missions.  
“Stability and support operations” is an incredibly broad term that can be applied in many 
contexts, but generally it refers to efforts to establish or maintain order and a secure 
environment.
72
  Counterinsurgency is another term that has various definitions, within 
which stability and security operations are sometimes included.  For this paper’s 
definition of irregular warfare, however, counterinsurgency refers to broad efforts to win 
the support of the local population, thereby denying the enemy a safe haven from which 
to operate.  Finally, special operations units have long comprised key capabilities of the 
U.S. military, but irregular warfare has increased the demand for these capabilities 
because they allow for increased flexibility and adaptation in hostile environments.    
 
Stability and Support Operations 
 Stability and support operations are key components of irregular warfare.  While 
U.S. forces have historically conducted stability and support operations in one form or 
another, only in the past decade have these types of operations been formally codified in 
U.S. military doctrine and accepted as essential elements of military operations.
73
  
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognized the importance of these kinds of 
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operations to prevent the need for future U.S. military involvement.  As an alternative to 
direct military action, he advocates a role for the U.S. military to help partner 
governments build their security and defensive capacities.
74
  This is summarized well by 
another scholar’s view: “No longer does the mission of the military stop at winning wars, 
now it must also help ‘win the peace.’”
75
   
On the other hand, stability operations are also crucial to recovery after an initial 
military intervention, and the military is often the only entity capable of conducting them. 
Melillo notes that while civilian organizations, such as the State Department, may be the 
preferred agencies to oversee postwar reconstruction, only the military has the 
“expeditionary capability to deploy to austere (and war-ravaged) environments and 
sustain itself while providing the requisite assistance to restore order and promote U.S. 
interests.”
76
  Jack Kem endorses the use of the military for these types of operations, 
because long-term stability is a military operational priority.
77
  
The acceptance of stability and support operations as a military function in the 
past decade has had significant organizational implications across the service branches.  
Each branch of the U.S. military, especially the Army and Marine Corps, adapted their 
structure and capabilities to accommodate deployments for stability operations and 
provide training to troops who would not likely participate in stability operations in 
conventional war.
78
  Given the manpower-intensive nature of stability operations, the 
Army and Marine Corps had to draw from other units to fill the ranks of troops 
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traditionally charged with stability operations-related missions.  Not only did the services 




About five years after the beginning of the war in Iraq, President George W. 
Bush, announced 30,000 additional troops would be deployed to Iraq, a strategy known 
as the “surge.”  These troops were essentially charged with security and support 
operations, in order to empower Iraq to take control of its domestic security, eventually 
leading to the withdrawal of all American combat troops.  The troop deployments 
required for this surge, as well as the costs of training and equipping host nation forces 
were funded by Congressional supplementary budget allocations.
80
  With the absence of 
the Congressional discretionary spending that funded a large portion of the costs of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, budgetary planning and resource allocation will have to 
take into account additional reorganization, training, and reassignment of resources 
required for stability and security operations in the future.  As the military already 
organized into a structure that facilitates these types of operations, future costs will focus 
on maintaining the established capability of conducting security and support operations. 
Many military strategists argue that defense funding should focus more on 
specialized equipment needed for stability and support operations rather than on high-
tech, costly conventional military equipment.  Gates captures this sentiment by stating, 
“A given ship or aircraft, no matter how capable, can be in only one place at one time.”
81
  
He goes on to explain that the existing military procurement processes favor 
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conventional, high-tech equipment, while it is just as necessary, and potentially more 
cost-effective, to build numbers of equipment such as up-armored Humvees, Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, or intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) programs.
82
  Thus, while conventional warfare requires a budget 
focused on high-tech weapons and other military materiel, an increased focus on irregular 
warfare would shift resource allocation toward tactical equipment and programs 
associated with ISR.  Future planning can accommodate a combination of both types of 
warfare capabilities, however.  Referring to Gates’ quote above, budget planners could 
slightly decrease or simply not opt to increase certain conventional warfare capabilities.  
Instead of allocating funds for a costly battleship or fighter jet that would increase 
conventional warfare capabilities only marginally, for example, budgetary planners could 
expend that money on several Humvees, MRAPs, or ISR capabilities, significantly 
contributing to an increased ability to conduct security and stability operations.   
 
Counterinsurgency 
 Counterinsurgency is arguably one of the most hotly debated topics among 
contemporary military scholars and strategists.  Although this paper will not debate the 
merits and drawbacks of counterinsurgency, the fact remains that this strategy has 
become entrenched U.S. military operations in the past decade and must be considered 
when looking at costs and resource allocation.  At its core, the goal of counterinsurgency 
is to deny the enemy support by winning the trust and loyalty of the local population.  
This is a time- and resource-intensive strategy, as it requires constant presence among the 
local population.  Secretary Gates iterated that “measures aimed at promoting better 




governance, economic programs that spur development and efforts to address the 
grievances of the discontented, from which terrorists recruit” must take precedence over 
military kinetic operations whenever possible.
83
  Nagl and Burton discuss the proposal 
that civilian agencies would be responsible for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, including 
nation-building activities.  Despite efforts to build the necessary capabilities within 
civilian agencies, such as the State Department, they conclude that the military currently 
maintains the most substantial ability to conduct these efforts.
84
 
 Counterinsurgency efforts are a key component of irregular warfare, but they can 
be extremely costly, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Reynolds accepts that 
counterinsurgency efforts are a key component of irregular warfare, but warns against 
using conventional forces for this purpose, citing the extremely high costs of 
deployments as a reason.
85
  Like Reynolds, Floersheim recognizes the necessity of 
counterinsurgency elements within irregular warfare, particularly training host nation 
military and security forces.  His recommendation calls for a restructuring and expansion 
of Army training procedures and commands for both active duty and reserve units to 
ensure that the Army’s own soldiers have the skills necessary to train foreign troops.
86
  
Michael Horowitz and Dan Shalmon likewise focus on the training aspect of conducting 
counterinsurgency operations, arguing that an adjustment in U.S. military culture is 
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To avoid the expense incurred by large numbers of forward-deployed 
conventional forces while still maintaining the ability to conduct effective 
counterinsurgency operations, Carter Malkasian and J. Kael Weston advocate small, elite 
military teams living and working with the local population.  Focusing on the current 
situation in Afghanistan and approach to U.S. withdrawal, they acknowledge that Afghan 
government would likely be unable to maintain security in the country if the U.S. pulled 
out completely, potentially undermining the efforts of the U.S. in the past decade.  In 
order to prevent this outcome while simultaneously taking into account the current 
constrained fiscal environment in the U.S., the authors propose leaving these small, elite 
military advisory teams in Afghanistan after the broader U.S. military drawdown 
scheduled for 2014.  These teams would serve as advisors to Afghan security forces, and 
would live and work among their Afghan counterparts.  Their withdrawal would be 
gradual and steady in order to ease the security transition at a manageable cost to the 
U.S.
88
 The increased emphasis on this element of irregular warfare reduces the costs 
required for troop deployment and eliminates operating costs for large military bases, 
thereby reducing the overall funds needed to fulfill strategic military objectives.   
 
Special Operations 
 As a key component of irregular warfare, special operations have increased 
markedly in the past decade.  Gates cites the increase in Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
funding and personnel as one of the major strides the military has made in the post-9/11 
era.
89
  The increased visibility and importance of the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is a further example of the 
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establishment of SOF as a cornerstone of irregular warfare, as Melillo notes.  He also 
mentions the shift of certain tasks for which SOF was previously responsible to 
conventional units in order to allow SOF to focus on its specialized missions.
90
   
 Due to SOF elements’ ability to conduct specialized missions accurately and 
efficiently, they are often viewed as more cost-effective than conventional forces.  
Reynolds argues for continued increases in funding for SOF, reasoning that they can “do 
more with less,” thereby demonstrating higher efficiency.  He contrasts the relatively low 
budget for USSOCOM with astronomical funding apportioned for procurement and 
technology costs for the services, primarily for conventional warfare capabilities.
91
  
Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman hold a similar view of the cost–effectiveness of 
SOF.  While they argue for an overall reduction in U.S. defense spending, they 
acknowledge that SOF can adequately handle the most important U.S. defense missions.  
Consequently, Adams and Leatherman advocate a smaller, more focused military in order 
to reduce budgets without compromising U.S. security.
92
  SOF elements are a crucial 
component of the lower cost counterinsurgency strategy proposed by Makalsian and 
Weston because they would be capable of conducting counterterrorism missions and 
support operations for Afghan security forces when needed, rather than maintaining a 
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The Future of Irregular Warfare 
The three factors discussed above set the stage for examining the implications for 
resource allocation and budgetary planning necessitated by the shift from conventional to 
irregular warfare.  In order for this discussion to be accurate, however, one must assume 
that this shift will continue after the conclusion of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Nagl and Burton accept that this will be the case, as conventional military threats to the 
U.S. have not increased while the demand for counterinsurgency and stability operations 
has remained at the forefront of defense operations in the post-9/11 era.
94
  While Tucker 
and Conroy do not necessarily disagree that irregular warfare will not dominate future 
conflicts, they worry that the expertise needed to maintain U.S. conventional warfare 
superiority is quickly disappearing from today’s Army, as training favors irregular 
warfare missions, as mentioned above.
95
  Regardless of the caveats they may add, most 
defense experts recognize that elements of irregular warfare are here to stay in one form 
or another, and the U.S. military must prepare to accommodate it. 
The discussion of the three elements of irregular warfare outlined above sets the 
stage to examine the relationship between U.S. costs of defense and the increased 
emphasis on this type of warfare.  Given that the majority of defense experts expect 
irregular warfare to persist to at least some degree in future military planning, strategy, 
and operations, the above information indicates that resource allocation and costs will 
shift accordingly.  Therefore, the case study will seek to determine how the shift from 
conventional to irregular warfare affects U.S. defense spending planning and resource 
allocation.  
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Case Study: Comparing the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review 
 In order to understand how the shift to irregular warfare has influenced defense 
budgetary planning, one must consider the changes in resource allocation.  One could 
compare the defense budgets of two representative years, but this would not accurately 
capture ongoing trends.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, much of the funds for the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars came in the form of supplemental funding, so looking at the budget 
without also taking into account the resources funded by these supplemental 
appropriations would provide a skewed analysis.  Additionally, portions of the defense 
budget are classified, which prevents the comparison of specific items.   
The best way to understand the budgetary implications resulting from the shift 
from conventional to irregular warfare is to compare defense budget planning 
recommendations that drive the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which projects 
estimated costs for defense programs over a five-year period.  These recommendations 
are presented in congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), so by 
examining the evolution of QDRs over time and comparing the differences between 
them, one can better understand the how shifts in U.S. defense policy and strategic 
paradigms affect resource allocation and budget planning. 
When the Cold War ended, the United States suddenly had no clear objective 
around which to base its military strategy and spending.  As a result, Congress called for 
a full-scale reassessment of defense strategy and priorities in order to guide defense 
programming, operational planning and budgets.
96
  The first of these assessments was the 
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1990 Base Force Analysis, which was followed by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.  In 
1997, Congress passed legislation mandating regular assessments, now known as 
Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), to occur in the year following the U.S. presidential 
election.  These reviews examine current defense strategy and programs and attempt to 
forecast the future course of defense priorities for the next 20 years.
97
  Not surprisingly, 
however, current U.S. defense posture is strikingly different from that envisioned in the 
1993 Bottom-Up Review’s 20-year projection. 
The situations under which the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR were 
conducted are similar in a few significant ways.  Both of these reviews were released two 
years after the peak year of the wars by which they were influenced.  That is to say, the 
peak year of the Persian Gulf War, which represents the focus on conventional warfare, 
occurred in 1991, and the peak year of the post-9/11 conflicts occurred in 2008.
98
  Given 
this timeframe, it is logical to conclude that the respective wars influenced the 
recommendations and analyses set forth in each of the reviews, a fact acknowledged 
within each of the documents.  Additionally, each of the Reviews was conducted in the 
face of declining defense budgets and White House direction to reduce overall military 
spending levels.  As a result, they both examine how to increase efficiency of existing 
defense assets and invest wisely in future capabilities in order to remain capable of 
defending U.S. strategic national interests and responding to potential future threats. 
Although similar in some respects, the conditions under which both Reviews were 
conducted also differed in some significant aspects.  The Bottom-Up Review was 
produced at a time where quadrennial reviews were not mandatory, and although the 
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Base Force Analysis had been released in 1990, there was no established procedure or 
structure for producing this kind of review.  The 2010 QDR, however, was written in 
accordance with the requirement of the 1997 law mandating quadrennial reviews, and it 
followed the process established by its three predecessors.  Furthermore, the 
recommendations and reviews of the Bottom-Up Review followed the United States’ 
involvement in a war in Iraq the first time, a war that was fought with conventional 
means and strategies.   The 2010 QDR, on the other hand, was conducted while the 
United States was fighting in Iraq for a second time, this time engaged in a conflict that 
was more irregular than conventional. 
 The 1993 Bottom-Up Review was conducted largely because the United States 
found itself for the first time in decades without a known threat to guide its defense 
policy and posture.  The Cold War mentality continued to dominate defense planning, 
however, and it is reflected in all aspects of the Bottom-Up Review.  The Review 
followed soon after the Persian Gulf War, a conflict that epitomizes modern conventional 
warfare.  Consequently, the analyses, assessments, and recommendations set forth in the 
Review have a distinctly conventional outlook.  Given this focus, the Bottom-Up Review 
will serve as the basis for understanding the force structure, costs and implications 
associated with conventional warfare in this case study.     
 As outlined above, since the beginning of the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, U.S. defense policy has shifted from conventional warfare toward irregular 
warfare.  This shift is evident in the content of the 2010 QDR, which includes the three 
aforementioned aspects of irregular warfare – security and stability operations, 
 53 
counterinsurgency, and Special Operations – as key initiatives in rebalancing the force.
99
  
As a result, the 2010 QDR will represent the irregular warfare considerations within this 
comparison. 
This study will examine the defense themes reflected in each of the reviews and 
analyze the resource allocation and budget structure associated with these themes.  The 
study will also compare the projected future budgets for the FYDP each Review 
recommends, as well as the areas of growth within each FYDP.  By comparing the 
recommendations and analyses of these two Reviews, one can understand the resource 
and budget differences between conventional and irregular warfare. 
 
The 1993 Bottom-Up Review  
The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was conducted in 1993 to define the strategy, 
force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed for the 
U.S. military in a post-Cold War world.
100
  The Review mentions several key lessons 
learned from the Persian Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm, and it focuses its strategy 
on countering nuclear dangers, regional dangers, dangers to democratic reform, and 
dangers to American economic prosperity.
101
  The recommendations set forth in the 
Review are consistent with a continued focus on conventional warfare.  The main 
premises of the defense strategy are to keep U.S. forces ready to fight, to sustain the 
quality of military personnel, and to maintain the technical superiority of U.S. military 
weapons and equipment, to which it attributes American success in Operation Desert 
Storm.  Recognizing the need for budget restraint, the Review nonetheless adopts as a 
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key tenet the need for a balanced modernization program.
102
  Based on the objectives and 




Table 1: 1993 Bottom-Up Review Force Structure 
Army 10 Active Divisions 
5+ Reserve Divisions 
Navy 11 Active Aircraft Carriers 
1 Reserve/Training Aircraft Carrier  
45-55 Attack Submarines 
346 Ships 
Air Force 13 Active Fighter Wings 
7 Reserve Fighter Wings  
Up to 184 bombers (B·52H, B-1, B-2) 
Marine Corps 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 
174,000 Active Personnel  
42,000 Reserve Personnel  
Strategic Nuclear Forces 18 Ballistic Missile Submarines 
Up to 94 B-52H Bombers 
20 B-2 Bombers 
500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead) 
 
In addressing force modernization, the Bottom-Up Review focuses on the 
following programs: theater air forces, attack and reconnaissance helicopters, ballistic 
missile defense, aircraft carriers, attack submarines, space launch, military satellite 
communications, and V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.
104
  Citing the effectiveness of air 
operations in the Persian Gulf War, the Review describes the need for modernization and 
replacement of aging combat aircraft including the A-6 Intruder, F-15C/D Eagle, F-
16A/B Fighting Falcon, and the F-14A/D Tomcat.
105
  After examining the requirements, 
programs and operational capabilities, the Review sets forth its decisions to proceed with 
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development and procurement of both F/A-18 E/F and the F-22, retire the A-6, cancel the 
A/F-X and the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF), and terminate production of the F-16.
106
  The 
Review takes a similar approach when considering modernization of Army attack and 
reconnaissance helicopters, deemed essential to “conduct the fast-paced maneuver-type 
warfare [expected] to dominate future conflicts.”
107
  The recommendation for this 
modernization focuses on fielding and procuring the RAH-66 Comanche, and the AH-64 
C/D with Longbow, the justification of this option being the enhanced capability these 
systems provide for a reasonable cost.
108
  The Review also advises spending 
approximately $18 billion over the FYDP for ballistic missile defense, and directs 
funding for a new aircraft carrier and attack submarines as part of modernization 
efforts.
109
  This modernization decisions demonstrate a shift in Cold War thinking and 
acceptance of decreasing military spending, but they also show a persistent focus on 
conventional warfare. 
Another key component of the Bottom-Up Review is the emphasis on reserve 
component forces.  The Review has a favorable opinion of reserve forces, attributing 
much of the success of the Persian Gulf War to the commitment, dedication, and 
professionalism of these forces.
110
  Although recognizing the importance of reserve 
forces, the Review proposes reductions in size or consolidation of missions across the 
services to better meet the requirements of a post-Cold War military. 
In addition to outlining key modernization and strategy changes, the Bottom-Up 
Review considers the economic costs and savings that accompany its recommendations.  
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The Review was conducted to develop a strategic framework for reduction in defense 
spending, specifically to identify ways to reduce the $1.325 trillion baseline cost of the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for 1995-1999 to reach the Clinton 
administration’s target goal of $1.221 trillion.  The recommendations of the Review 
trimmed the proposed FYDP 1995-1999 budget by $91 billion dollars in adjustments to 
the FYDP for 1995-1999, savings that included $24 billion cut from force structure and 
$32 from recommendations related to modernization and investment.
111
  
The Bottom-Up Review’s focus on high-tech acquisition and maintenance of 
conventional military capabilities exemplify the mindset of the U.S. defense planners and 
policymakers following the Cold War.  Because no one had been exposed to conflicts 
like those that would be conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan nearly a decade later, the 
Review projected a somewhat reduced force designed to counter any threats through 
maintaining superior conventional capabilities.  It was this mindset that influenced the 
planning for the “fast-paced maneuver-type warfare” mentioned above that would largely 
fall by the wayside in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.   
 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 
 The 2010 QDR was conducted in the height of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The recommendations and themes found in the 2010 QDR are significantly 
different than those of the Bottom-Up Review, in large part due to the shift away from 
conventional warfare toward irregular warfare.  The QDR further differs from the 
Bottom-Up Review in that the United State was still heavily embroiled in conflict in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in 2010, whereas in 1993 they had emerged the clear victor of the 
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Persian Gulf War.  These factors are reflected in the stark differences between many 
aspects of the two Reviews. 
 The contrast between the Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR is evident as 
early as the second paragraph of the Executive Summary of the QDR, which includes 
phrases such as “strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces” and “advise, 
train, and support Iraqi security forces,” and which mentions “allies and partners” twice.  
The objectives it sets forth, however, echo those included the Bottom-Up Review – to 
rebalance and reform the military in order to provide the United States with adequate 
defense capabilities while considering the economic implications of doing so.
112
  Like the 
Bottom-Up Review, the 2010 QDR sets forth recommendations to guide the FYDP, in 
this case for fiscal years 2011-2015.  The force structure it recommends is summarized in 
Table 2 below.113  
Table 2: 2010 QDR Recommended Force Structure 
Army 4 Corps headquarters 
18 Division headquarters 
73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) (45 Active and 28 
Reserve) 
21 Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) (13 Active and 8 
Reserve) 
15 Patriot battalions 
Navy 10-11 Aircraft Carriers and 10 carrier air wings 
53-55 Attack Submarines and 4 Guided Missile Submarines 
225-256 Ships  
126 – 171 land-based ISR and EW aircraft (manned and 
unmanned) 
3 maritime prepositioning squadrons 
Air Force 8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission 
aircraft) 
30 – 32 Airlift and Aerial Refueling Wing-equivalents (with 
33 primary mission aircraft per wing equivalent) 
10 – 11 Theater Strike Wing-equivalents  
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5 Long-range Strike (bomber) wings  
6 Air Superiority Wing-equivalents 
3 Command and Control Wings and 5 fully operational Air 
and Space Operations Centers  
10 Space and Cyberspace Wings 
Marine Corps 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 
4 Marine Divisions (3 Active and 1 Reserve) 
11 infantry regiments 
4 artillery regiments 
4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 rotary-wing 
groups, 4 control groups, 
4 support groups) 
4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments) 





Approximately 660 special operations teams (includes Army 
Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, 
Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special 
operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and 
operational aviation detachments [OADs]) 
3 Ranger battalions 
165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary 
mission aircraft 
 
This structure is more detailed than that contained in the 1993 Review, breaking 
force structures down into smaller components.  To explain the difference in Army force 
layout, recall that the Army changed its structure from division-based, which was 
effective for conventional warfare, to a brigade-based expeditionary force necessary for 
achieving success in irregular warfare.
115
  This shift in missions explains the change in 
force structure for most of the service branches.  The Navy has maintained similar 
projected numbers of carriers and submarines and decreased numbers of other ships, but 
increased ISR assets.  Likewise, the Air Force projected fighter and bomber capabilities 
are comparable between the two years, but the proposed increase in ISR and other 
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mission support capabilities is consistent with irregular warfare functions.  The 
breakdown of specific units within the Marine Corps rather than the numbers of 
personnel included in the Bottom-Up Review is consistent with the various roles the 
Marine Corps plays in irregular warfare missions.  Moreover, the inclusion of Special 
Operations Forces as a separate category also demonstrates the focus on the function they 
perform, which is a key component of irregular warfare, as discussed above.  Overall, 
budget recommendations indicate U.S. military planners intend to maintain (but not 
significantly increase) conventional capabilities while also placing more emphasis on 
those military components required for success in irregular warfare.  
The 2010 QDR acknowledges the continued superior combat capabilities of the 
U.S. military, but it also focuses on the roles and responsibilities that accompany that 
distinction in the international system.  This exemplifies the idea that U.S. core strategic 
objectives can remain the same while the paradigm for fulfilling them – in this case, 
irregular vs. conventional warfare – can change dramatically within a few years.  The 
QDR uses the term “hybrid” war to discuss the myriad new strategies that enemies might 
cultivate in order to circumvent the superiority of American conventional warfare 
capabilities.
116
  In order to maintain American military superiority as well as the ability to 
defend the homeland, then, adaptability and flexibility are paramount to U.S. defense 
strategy.  This is reflected in the four key strategic objectives laid out in the QDR: 1) 
prevail in today’s conflicts, 2) prevent and deter conflict, 3) prepare to defeat adversaries 
and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and 4) preserve and enhance the All-
Volunteer force.
117
  Although these objectives could be applied to both conventional and 
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irregular wars, the 2010 QDR moves away from basing objectives and force structure on 
the ability to fight two major regional wars, and instead broadens the scope to the 
possibility of facing various scenarios.
118
 
Given that it was conducted while the United States was deeply involved in wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2010 QDR accordingly presents recommendations and 
analyses for both homeland defense and overseas operations.   Moreover, it 
acknowledges that the recommendations serve as the basis for further defense reform and 
restructure in the future, even after the 2011-2015 FYDP.
119
  Homeland defense 
initiatives presented in the QDR include reorganizing consequence management response 
forces, enhancing capabilities for domain awareness, accelerating the development of 
standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and enhance domestic counter-IED 
capabilities.
120
  The core of the study however, remains focused on the U.S. military 
functions vis-à-vis foreign enemies and aggressors. 
The QDR focuses many of its recommendations on succeeding in 
counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations as well as building the 
capacity of partner states, particularly through security force assistance (SFA) missions.  
The goal of SFA missions is to train host security forces so that they become wholly 
responsible for the security of their country, thereby significantly reducing or even 
eliminating the need for the presence of U.S. forces.
121
 The recommendations included in 
the Review are quite robust, consisting of changes in methods and procedures as well as 
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additional technical equipment and capabilities.  It is clear from the detail and recurring 
themes within the QDR that these types of operations are the way ahead for the U.S. 
military, and the force rebalancing will reflect this across the spectrum of military 
planning for the foreseeable future.   
On the strategy and methodological side, the QDR advocates expanding 
intelligence, analysis, and targeting capabilities, which are essential to counterinsurgency 
and special operations missions.  This expansion includes additional manpower, training 
and support systems for collection, dissemination, and analysis of information.
122
  Many 
of these capabilities will appear in units that provide organic combat support to special 
operations forces, including logistics, communications, information support, and forensic 
and intelligence analysis.
123
  Other requirements include active-duty civil affairs forces 
and enhanced language and regional expertise within the military, which will assist in 
both counterinsurgency operations and SFA missions.  The QDR cites the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) $33 million investment in language training detachments for general 
forces and $14 million for Special Forces language training as evidence of this.
124
  
Overall, these changes require a reevaluation of personnel management practices, 
professional military education, and career development pathways. 
In terms of technical equipment, the QDR calls for an increase in both fixed- and 
rotary-wing assets and AC-103 gunships.  These aircraft are essential for transporting and 
resupplying troops in the remote locations often associated with counterinsurgency 
efforts, training partner forces, and providing combat support to special operations forces.  
Additionally, countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
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requires additional airborne electronic warfare (EW) platforms such as the C-130, E/A-
18G, and the EA-13B aircraft, and manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are 
necessary for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
125
 
The 2010 QDR does address threats from hostile nation-states that the U.S. would 
traditionally counter with conventional warfare capabilities.  It outlines specific nation-
states that could pose a threat to the United States with advanced conventional or nuclear 
weapons and it considers certain vulnerabilities the United States faces as a result.  The 
section of the QDR that discusses this threat, however, is noticeably smaller and less 
detailed than other elements discussed above.  Moreover, the recommendations set forth 
lack the specificity observed in other sections of the QDR, and the programs are 
discussed in a vague, non-committal nature.  The threat is not ignored completely, but the 
efforts associated with countering it are continuations of existing programs rather than 




Shift in Resource and Budget Allocations 
 As seen from the discussion about the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. defense costs and resource allocation shifted 
dramatically during this time period.  Both reviews seek to eliminate superfluous 
programs and materiel in order to cut the overall budget, but that is about the extent of the 
similarities between the two studies.  The Bottom-Up Review focused on downsizing the 
U.S. military in the wake of the Cold Ware while maintaining overall military superiority 
in conventional warfare capabilities.  Citing specific order of battle and force structure 
rather than broad ideas or strategies, the Review barely addressed cooperation with allies 
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or advising and training roles for the military in partner nations.  This is obvious in the 
message from the Secretary of Defense that serves as the foreword to the Review; the 
message refers to maintaining capabilities to fight and win major regional conflicts, 
improving strategic mobility, enhancing anti-armor capabilities and overall continuing to 
project superior American military might around the world.
127
  
 On the other hand, the 2010 QDR consistently refers to partner nations, allies, and 
international cooperation in its recommendations.  While it, too, recognizes the need to 
maintain sufficient combat capabilities, this Review highlights efforts to prevent conflicts 
through international engagement and assistance as well as training host nation security 
forces to take control of their own defense.  This is evident in the message from the 
Secretary of Defense at the beginning of the 2010 QDR, which takes a much different 
tone than that which prefaces the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.  The message in 2010 
acknowledges that the QDR reflects the wartime environment, but whereas the Secretary 
recognizes the need for conventional and strategic military modernization programs, he 
also emphasizes the “importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with 
and through allies and partners.”  Both of these elements compose the “broad portfolio of 
military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of 




A comparison of the force structures presented in both the Bottom-Up Review 
and the 2010 QDR as recommendations for the FYDP provides good insight into the 
effect the shift from conventional to irregular warfare has had on resource allocation.  
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Although the 2010 QDR does recommend forces and equipment needed for conventional 
capabilities, the quantities are not substantially greater than those recommended in the 
1993 Bottom-Up Review.  For example, the number of aircraft carriers and attack 
submarines remains largely unchanged, and the number of ships actually decreases 
slightly.  If conventional wars were predicted to increase or remain at the center of U.S. 
defense policy and planning, one would expect a noticeable increase in the numbers 
recommended for these capabilities, as they would constitute the backbone of American 
military doctrine.   
The fact that conventional warfare capabilities have remained relatively constant 
for almost two decades of FYDP planning indicates that even if defense planners do not 
expect conventional warfare to disappear, they anticipate budget priorities to more 
closely align with irregular warfare-related efforts.  The breakdown of the 2010 and 
projected 2020 defense budgets in Figure 1 below reinforces this idea.  If conventional 
warfare capabilities were expected to increase, the projected Acquisitions portion of 
the budget would likely remain closer to current levels rather than shrinking by 
2020.  The increase in Operations and Maintenance is consistent with maintaining 
but not increasing conventional capabilities, as well as reflecting the irregular 








Figure 1: DoD Budget with No Real Growth: FY2010-FY2020
129
 
(Constant FY10 dollars in billions) 
 
Although the base amount of equipment recommended for conventional 
capabilities is relatively constant over the two Reviews, the 2010 QDR includes many 
additional capabilities designed for irregular warfare capabilities.  For example, it 
recommends additional ISR assets for both the Air Force and Navy.  This begs the 
question, then, about the cost implications of this recommendation.  While the 
                                                        
129
 Daggett, “QDR 2010,” 62. 
 66 
conventional military capabilities (i.e. aircraft carriers, attack submarines, etc.) have 
expensive price tags, the only cost they incur at this point are operation and maintenance 
purposes, since they are already present in U.S. military arsenals.  The fact that the QDR 
maintains overall levels of this equipment means that new purchases and acquisitions are 
likely used for irregular warfare-related costs.  When these conventional capabilities are 
no longer functional, will policymakers continue to focus on resources associated with 
irregular warfare?  If not, how will they decide which item has priority?  Additionally, 
with the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as U.S. economic 
troubles at home, budgets are likely going to become tighter in future years, forcing U.S. 
defense planners to choose between these capabilities.  Because the shift toward irregular 
warfare has occurred during wartime and has been funded largely by budgetary 
supplementals, there is no reliable way of predicting how the U.S. military will balance 
the costs or determine how to allocate resources during peacetime. 
The comparison between the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR 
demonstrates that a change in the allocation of resources and budgetary planning for 
defense has occurred in the past almost two decades.  Given the capabilities and 
strategies reflected in the most current QDR that focus on security operations, greater ISR 
capabilities, and expansion of special operations missions, this change is supports the 
observation of a shift from conventional toward irregular warfare and countering 






 The nature of the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the 
shift from conventional toward irregular warfare in U.S. defense strategy.  These 
conflicts relied heavily on the three core elements of irregular warfare: security and 
stability operations, counterinsurgency, and special operations forces.  While U.S. 
defense experts disagree about the degree to which the United States should forego its 
conventional capabilities in favor of developing and increasing those associated with 
irregular warfare, most concur that future conflicts in which the United States becomes 
involved will entail at least some aspects of irregular warfare necessary to counter 
asymmetric threats.  Consequently, U.S. defense budget planning and resource allocation 
will continue to focus on programs and equipment designed for irregular warfare 
operations.  Rather than increasing conventional weapons, such as fighter aircraft and 
attack submarines, defense spending allows for greater numbers of tactical equipment and 
ISR assets, as well as more training and cultural programs for military personnel.    
 As the United States has not planned for peacetime budgets since the increased 
focus on irregular warfare, the overall cost of this shift away from conventional warfare 
is not yet fully evident.  U.S. defense policymakers were able to build irregular warfare 
capabilities with budget supplementals allocated for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so 
they have not yet had to balance conventional and irregular warfare capabilities in the 
overall defense budget.  It is likely, however, that the overall cost of defense will 
decrease because of the lower costs associated with the primary elements of irregular 
warfare, as presented above.  For example, it is less expensive to increase the number of 
MRAPs and Humvees than it is to procure tanks.  Similarly, investment in language and 
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cultural training for military personnel will pay more long-term dividends than procuring 
an additional battleship or fighter jet.  Future military operations may not involve the 
exact same missions and conditions U.S. troops experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
they will very likely be focused on countering asymmetric threats that will require 
resources that fall outside the focus of conventional warfare. 
Although some elements of irregular warfare, such as counterinsurgency 
missions, are manpower intensive, these costs occur primarily only in times of conflict 
and are not incurred during times of peace.  This can be seen in the current projections of 
reduced troop levels over the next few years.  With the counterinsurgency missions in 
Afghanistan drawing to a close, the U.S. military can afford to reduce its forces while 
maintaining the ability to ensure strategic defense priorities.   Should the United States 
become involved in a conflict necessitating counterinsurgency operations in the future, 
however, it can rebuild the necessary troop strengths without needlessly incurring the 
costs of maintaining high troop levels at all times.  Thus, even in cases where the initial 
cost of irregular warfare capabilities is high, the long-term costs are generally lower.  
Irregular warfare, which will continue to be present in U.S. military doctrine and 
planning, will require less funding to achieve U.S. strategic objectives, and will 
contribute to reduced costs of defense in the long run.  
 69 




 As with other elements of U.S. strategic defense policy, the first decade of the 
twenty-first saw an enormous shift in U.S. strategic intelligence planning and priorities.  
The September 11 terrorist attacks enraged the American public and caught U.S. 
policymakers and military officials off-guard, prompting a substantial overhaul of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).  Scholars and policymakers alike had previously 
noted the need to reform the outdated Cold War-focused strategic intelligence paradigm 
in the United States, but the 9/11 attacks provided the impetus for doing so.   As a result, 
today’s IC looks much different from the U.S. intelligence apparatus in place in 2001, 
and the reforms have consequently affected American strategic intelligence planning.  
U.S. strategic intelligence planning refers to the national-level coordination and 
allocation of intelligence resources and capabilities to determine and mitigate the highest 
priority threats to U.S. national security and protect U.S. national interests.  Although 
there are aspects of national security that are outside the DoD scope, strategic intelligence 
planning directly relates to U.S. strategic defense policy through a common and 
interrelated focus on countering threats to the United States and safeguarding U.S. 
national interests. 
The Congressional Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community Activities 
before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2011 assumed initial 
responsibility for investigating the performance of U.S. intelligence organizations 
regarding the events of 9/11, and it released its findings and recommendations in 
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December 2002.  Yielding to demand for a thorough, independent investigation into the 
factors that contributed to the attacks, Congress and President George W. Bush created 
the bipartisan, independent National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States, more commonly known as the 9/11 Commission.  Among the Commission’s 
several recommendations for IC reforms based on identified intelligence failures was the 
establishment of a national director of intelligence.  Congress enacted many of these 
recommendations through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA), including creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  The 
authorities granted to the DNI by IRTPA, however, were much weaker than those 
envisioned by the 9/11 Commission, prompting vigorous debate among national 
policymakers, intelligence and military officials, and other national defense experts.  
Vigorous debate notwithstanding, the DNI is currently a key player in the 
structure of the IC, responsible for many strategic intelligence planning duties and 
decisions.  In addition to this new IC structure, the U.S. strategic intelligence focus today 
is also very different than it was at the time of the 9/11 attacks, and consequently, so are 
strategic intelligence considerations.  Although many scholars have explored the various 
merits and drawbacks of the creation of the DNI, few have questioned the relationship 
between this position and the current strategic planning model.  In an effort to address 
this issue, this chapter will explore the following research question: How did the creation 
of the DNI affect the U.S. strategic intelligence planning paradigm?   
The main argument set forth herein determines that the DNI is able to better 
formulate strategic intelligence planning guidance across the IC than was his predecessor, 
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), by virtue of the tools and responsibilities 
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inherent in the DNI position.  He uses the tools at his disposal, particularly the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), to prioritize intelligence requirements in such a 
way as to allow for both long-term, standing intelligence needs as well as short-term, 
unanticipated strategic intelligence requirements.  Although intelligence is inexact by 
nature, this system allows the DNI to allocate resources and focus analytical efforts on 
issues that are of highest priority to the IC, while maintaining flexibility to respond to 
international incidents as necessary.  This ability, combined with the improvement in 
analysis across the IC and other DNI initiatives, positions the IC as a whole to better 
prevent strategic surprise and counter threats to U.S national interests in the future. 
The author will first explore the prevailing literature surrounding the factors 
affecting the creation of the DNI, as well as the performance of the position to date.  It 
will then draw upon the DNI’s use of his “sole mechanism for establishing national 
intelligence priorities,”
130
 the NIPF, to compare the current strategic intelligence planning 
process with that in place prior to 9/11, namely the process and priorities enumerated by 
President Bill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD 35).  In doing so, the 
author will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each method to determine the 
effectiveness of the NIPF as a tool for strategic intelligence planning, and how the DNI 
relies upon it for this planning process.  Finally, the chapter will present an analysis of the 
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The Path to Intelligence Reform and the Creation of the DNI 
The creation and performance of the DNI and the intelligence reform efforts that 
led to the establishment of this office provide the basis for some of the most contentious 
debates among contemporary intelligence scholars and practitioners today.  Although 
discussions surrounding this office reflect a few common themes, the views of experts in 
the intelligence field vary regarding the specific factors and processes that led to its 
creation.  Likewise, assessments of its performance and prognostications for the future 
are far from uniform in their analyses.  This literature review will explore the viewpoints 
surrounding the creation and performance to date of the position of the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) in order to assess holistically its impact on and role in 
strategic intelligence planning.   
The idea of creating a national director of intelligence was broached long before 
publication of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker traces 
the roots of the call for a centralized intelligence director to 1955, after which time it was 
repeatedly advocated, particularly in the wake of the Cold War.  Tucker cites 
bureaucratic and political resistance as reasons the proposal failed each time it was 
presented, even with backing from influential individuals or political bodies.
131
  Amy 
Zegart offers a detailed discussion of the various pre-9/11 government commissions and 
studies that, according to her research, offered 340 recommendations to improve 
intelligence capabilities across the board.
132
  Arthur Hulnick similarly dates the 
recommendation for a DNI to the beginning of the Cold War, but remains unconvinced 
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this course of action is necessary, observing, “Every investigation of U.S. intelligence 
cannot help but conclude that the system is unworkable as now constituted.  Yet, it seems 
to function in spite of its complexity, bureaucracy, and lines of command.”
133
  Indeed, 
few reforms advocated in the post-9/11 period had not been suggested previously, and 
there remained staunch critics of many aspects of reform.   
Despite historical failure and vocal opposition from some scholars, many of the 
9/11 Commission’s recommendations, including the creation of the DNI, were 
implemented through IRTPA.  So why did intelligence reform come to fruition in the 
post-9/11 period when it had failed so often in the past?  The Commission’s findings 
exposed the poor quality of intelligence collection and analysis that led to “intelligence 
failures,” the lack of coordination both among the agencies within the IC and between the 
IC and law enforcement elements, the absence of central oversight regarding the 
activities and efforts of IC members. These primary factors drove many of the IRTPA 
provisions, including the creation of the DNI, although scholars vary in their emphasis of 
one factor over another.  Additionally, the political climate at the time of IRTPA’s 
creation was such that intelligence reform was a key issue, a significant reason this 
reform effort succeeded where previous efforts had not. 
 
Policy and Intelligence Failures 
Some scholars attribute at least some of the blame for the 9/11 attacks and failure 
to accurately assess Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program as policy failure 
as much as an intelligence failure.  At the beginning of their thorough examination of 
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intelligence reform and the creation of the DNI, John Negroponte, who served as the first 
DNI, and Edward Wittenstein acknowledge that the IC shouldered an unfair portion of 
the blame for these events, and they assert that, “intelligence is not a substitute for sound 
diplomatic and defense policy.”
134
  Richard Betts also recognizes the importance of 
differentiating between policy and intelligence failures, and he highlights the potential for 
politicization in the debate between the two.
135
  These men, however, are undeniably in 
the minority when citing policy decisions as a contributing cause to the cataclysmic 
events of 9/11 and the erroneous assessment of Iraq WMDs.   
The majority of scholarly work addressing intelligence reform and the creation of 
the DNI cites the events of 9/11 and the search for WMD in Iraq as the driving events 
behind the reform of the IC.  In contrast to Negroponte and Wittenstein’s attempt to 
divide the blame between policy failures and intelligence failures, Richard Russell 
summarizes bluntly that “America’s intelligence performance in assessing Iraq’s WMD 
programs in the run-up to the 2003 war was… arguably one of the greatest intelligence 
failures since the CIA’s inception in 1947.”
136
  Russell tepidly applauds efforts to reform 
the IC, but argues that these reforms do not address the real problem, which he 
characterizes as “pathetically poor human intelligence and shoddy analysis primarily 
produced by the CIA.”
137
   Although his article deals with one particular agency, he 
advocates a change in institutional culture and business practices to address intelligence 
shortcomings, rather than a total restructure of the IC.  
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Lack of Coordination   
Some assessments, such as that presented in Richard Harknett and James Stever’s 
“The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11,” conclude that the driving factor was the 
need to bring domestic and foreign intelligence entities together to create an integrated 
homeland security component.  In their discussion of IRTPA and the resulting reforms, 
the authors acknowledge that, although terrorism threats prompted changes in the IC, the 
reforms focused on a wider scope of homeland security threats.  Combatting homeland 
security threats required a fusion of domestic and foreign intelligence, responsibility for 
which, prior to 9/11, resided in separate agencies with little if any collaboration.
138
  
Former DNI Mike McConnell deems the integration of domestic and foreign intelligence 
one of the most important responsibilities of the DNI, and even those who are otherwise 
critical of the Congressional recommendations generally recognize the importance of the 
homeland security aspect of intelligence reform.
139
  
One of the most often cited factors for the creation of the position of the DNI is 
the “stovepiping” that dominated the IC culture prior to reform efforts.  Harknett and 
Stever characterize the pre-reform IC as having an “individual-unit bureaucratic, silo-like 
orientation,” which prevented individual actors from pooling their efforts to adequately 
identify and prioritize strategic intelligence gaps.
140
  Along the same lines, Zegart 
believes that many of the pre-9/11 intelligence failures stemmed from “organizational 
routines and cultures that are highly resistant to change,” and many of the failures could 
have been avoided had certain agencies been less internally focused and more willing to 
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   In fact, the 9/11 Commission report lists “structural barriers to 
performing joint intelligence work” as the first of the problems indicating a need to 
restructure the IC.
142
  Although some scholars argue that the stovepiping issue would 
eventually be resolved through greater information sharing efforts aided by technological 
advances, this failure to share information was one of the primary factors in advancing 




Oversight and Management of the IC 
Prior to the creation of the DNI, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was 
dual-hatted as both the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the director 
of the entire national intelligence apparatus.  Although the suggestion to separate these 
two positions surfaced recurrently for decades, only after 9/11 did this idea become 
reality with the creation of the DNI.  In its published report, the 9/11 Commission 
outlined in detail the challenges the DCI faced prior to the creation of the DNI.  Citing 
the three jobs the DCI had – running the CIA, managing the “loose confederation of 
agencies that is the intelligence community,” and serving as principal intelligence advisor 
to the president – the Commission acknowledges that “no recent DCI has been able to do 
all three effectively.”
144
  Furthermore, the responsibility that was most often neglected 
was management of the IC, primarily because the DCI lacked strong authorities to carry 
out this task.  Citing his interactions with then-DCI George Tenet, Michael Hayden 
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refutes this claim that the DCI did not have the authorities needed to perform his job, but 
he concedes that “the source of his strength (that he was director of the CIA) brought 
with it inherent limitations.”  Hayden further observes that, based on his experience as a 
CIA director who was not also the DCI, he often wondered how his predecessors handled 
the many hats they had worn in the pre-IRTPA IC.
145
  Hayden’s observations echo those 
of many experts who reluctantly supported the creation of a DNI, recognizing that this 
move could potentially succeed in effecting positive intelligence reform.  In order to do 
so, however, the position would need to have very strong authorities over the entire IC, 
including the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components. 
 
Political Considerations 
Other intelligence scholars provide a more situational argument for the outcome 
of intelligence reform.  Recall the observations of Tucker, Hulnick, and Zegart 
mentioning the myriad attempts at intelligence reform, dating back almost to the IC’s 
inception.  Experts generally agree that the impetus for IRTPA was the failure of the U.S. 
to predict the 9/11 attacks, but the underlying reason reform succeeded on this occasion 
when previous efforts failed was an outcome of the situation in Washington in the early 
2000s. Whereas the question of intelligence reform had previously affected only 
Washington, the topic reached the wider American public preceding the presidential 
election of 2004 when the topic of intelligence failures contributing to the 9/11 attacks 
and Iraq WMDs became discussion points at the national level. Hayden candidly admits 
that the IC failed in the difficult but not impossible tasks regarding 9/11 and the Iraq 
WMD estimate, and he notes that “The American people had forgiven us for getting 
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some things wrong, but they wanted to see some visible changes.”
146
  Likewise, 
Hulnick’s anecdote about President George Bush announcing the creation of the DNI in 
response to John Kerry’s call to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations 
reinforces the idea that national politics were a significant factor in implementing various 
aspects of intelligence reform at the time.
147
   
Politics surrounding the presidential election was not the only factor creating a 
situation ideal for intelligence reform.  Zegart agrees that reform occurred due to the 
situation at the time, but rather than citing election politics, she focuses on three factors 
that created a favorable climate for reform in Washington: the resignation of CIA 
director, George Tenet, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report severely criticizing 
the IC’s assessments of Iraq’s WMD capabilities, and the 9/11 Commission’s final 
report.
148
  Negroponte and Wittenstein add “the scale of the 9/11 tragedy, the public 
nature of the ensuing enquiry, and the invasion of Iraq” to the list of contributing 
factors.
149
  Betts summarizes the importance of the situation regarding intelligence at the 
time, opining “if there were ever a moment where public demand might overcome the 
entrenched institutional interests that block radical change, this should be it.”
150
  None of 
these factors was significant enough in isolation to spur intelligence reform, but the 
aggregation of them created circumstances under which reform, including the creation of 
a DNI, was all but inevitable. 
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Challenges to DNI Creation and Implementation  
Although most experts agreed that intelligence reform was necessary in the wake 
of 9/11 and the search for WMDs in Iraq, the scope and nature of that reform remained a 
point of contention, particularly when discussing the creation of the DNI.  The 9/11 
Commission designed the DNI as centralized authority in an independent, national-level 
position to govern the IC and address shortcomings related to national intelligence.  The 
considerable reluctance of IC members and policy makers to embrace reform, even 
several years after its implementation, however, demonstrates the controversy that 
accompanied the creation of this office.  As envisioned by the 9/11 Commission and 
implemented by IRTPA, the DNI has as primary responsibilities overseeing the IC, 
serving as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, and managing the national 
intelligence program and overseeing its component agencies.
151
  The authorities granted 
to this office to carry out these duties, however, became points of contention between 
intelligence experts, politicians, and policymakers even before passage of IRTPA.  The 
major disputes lie in the scope of the authorities granted to the DNI, including the control 
it has over budgetary decisions, and the reach of its oversight and its role in the IC. 
 
Scope and Strength of Authorities  
Regardless of the acceptance (albeit sometimes reluctant) of intelligence experts 
to create a DNI, many scholars doubted the feasibility of creating a strong DNI, despite 
the recognized need for oversight of the IC promulgated by the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations.  The 9/11 Commission identified the authorities the DNI needed to 
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successfully fulfill its envisioned role as “control over purse strings, the ability to hire or 
fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure and 
personnel.”
152
  Accordingly, the Commission bestowed all three of these authorities upon 
its vision for a National Intelligence Director who would replace the DCI as principal 
intelligence advisor to the president and manager of the IC.   
Most experts recognized that the DNI’s success depended on his ability to 
exercise strong authorities over the IC, including the combat support agencies within the 
DoD – the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).  Without support over 
these agencies, as Hayden starkly explains, “there was real danger of Congress creating a 
leader of the IC who truly had less power than DCIs had historically been able to 
wield.”
153
 In a more realistic assessment, however, Betts highlighted the political 
challenges of giving a DNI control over DoD intelligence functions, explaining that the 
military “will never accept dependence on other departments for performance of their 
core functions, which include tactical intelligence collection, and politicians will not 
override military protests that their combat effectiveness is being put at risk.”
154
 
Negroponte and Wittenstein also discuss the opposition many intelligence 
components – the CIA and FBI in addition to DoD – expressed to falling under the 
authority of the DNI.  These components were able to influence Congress to the degree 
that IRTPA became “a consensus piece of legislation that created a DNI position with 
broad responsibilities but only vague authorities in critical respects.”
155
  Similar to this 
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view, Turner expressed the concern that the DNI’s level of central oversight would not 
solve the bureaucratic obstacles inherent in the IC, especially given the “piecemeal nature 
of the reforms.”
156
  Helen Fesseden summarizes the potential manifestation of this 
concern in her evaluation of Negroponte after his first few months in office: “Concern is 
growing that [ODNI] is simply another layer of bureaucracy over all agencies rather than 
a force that can push through necessary structural changes to streamline the intelligence 
community and foster more accountability.”
157
 
Despite the recommendations set forth by the 9/11 Commission and senior 
intelligence officials such as Hayden, IRTPA created a DNI without strong budgetary and 
oversight authorities entrenched in the office.  In Hayden’s view, political wrangling over 
the DNI’s control vis-à-vis other cabinet positions caused the legislation to be enacted 
without specifically defining this authority, instead leaving it open for the President to 
determine.  As a result, and much to Hayden’s chagrin, in 2008 the National Security 
Council (NSC) rewrote Executive Order 12333 to stipulate that the DNI “shall not 
abrogate the authorities of various department heads.”
158
  Negroponte and Wittenstein 
echo this view of the legislation’s shortcomings in their observation that “IRTPA stopped 
far short of creating a position akin to a Secretary of Intelligence.”
159
  This lack of 
inherent authority is perhaps one of the greatest ironies in the evolution of the DNI.  As 
discussed above, the 9/11 Commission advocated separating the roles of the DCI and the 
DNI largely due to a perceived lack of strong authority that contributed to the DCI’s 
failure to properly manage the IC prior to 9/11.  Because IRTPA avoided granting the 
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DNI with strong overarching authority across all of the elements of the IC, however, the 
DNI was not set up for success to accomplish this from its inception. 
 
Oversight and Role in IC  
In Betts’ astute opinion, it is impossible to avoid all intelligence failures, but the 
ability to prevent future mistakes “will come less from any structural or procedural tweak 
than from the good sense, good character, and good mental habits of senior officials.  
How to assure a steady supply of those, unfortunately, has never been clear.”
160
  
Similarly, Hulnick concedes that there is definite room for improvement in the IC, but he 
warns against reforms that are simply “hasty cosmetic adjustments.”
161
  That said, he also 
admits the creation of a DNI in conjunction with other carefully crafted steps “might help 
shift the U.S. intelligence system away from its lingering Cold War mentality to new 
thinking.”
162
  Russell’s view toward the creation of the DNI and other 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, however, is much harsher.  Unlike the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations and the views of many IC reform proponents, Russell advocates 
change from a grassroots level.  In his view, “The establishment of the DNI… 
unconstructively adds to the already bureaucratically bloated intelligence community.”
163
 
Harknett and Stever examine the challenges the DNI faces in carrying out the 
reforms envisioned in IRTPA.  Rather than explicitly mandating the DNI to carry out 
broad structural reform, IRTPA relies on “granted presidential authority and power of 
persuasion vis-à-vis existing intelligence agencies” to achieve this transformation of the 
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  Hayden holds a similar view, explaining that the DNI’s success depends on a 
“series of intangibles,” primarily political deftness, closeness to the President, and 
relationship with the CIA director.
165
  The relationship between the DNI and the CIA is 
one that has been understandably tenuous, although it varies somewhat depending on 
who occupies each position.  Hayden, having experience both as the deputy DNI and 
director of the CIA, is well qualified to explain the reasoning behind this tension: “The 
law puts the [DNI] at the center of the [IC].  History and tradition and even many current 
operations suggest that the DCIA, however, has pride of place, and the agency’s 
collective culture is reluctant to admit otherwise.”
166
  Betts similarly highlights the 
importance of the personalities in these key positions in his 2004 article, arguing, “The 
best chief of intelligence is one who has the personal confidence and trust of the 
president, but who delights in telling the inner circle what it does not want to hear.”
167
  
That hoping for compatible personalities between the DNI, the heads of other intelligence 
agencies and the president is the best resolution these scholars can offer bodes ill indeed 
for the future of the DNI.  Fesseden illustrates this idea in her 2005 evaluation of 
Negroponte’s performance as the first DNI, commenting “concern is growing that the 
former diplomat is better suited to forging smooth relations with the powers that be than 
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Assessment of DNI Performance  
Few would disagree that the position of DNI has not played the role the members 
of the 9/11 Commission advocated.  That point aside, however, evaluations of the DNI 
with regard to the underlying factors that led to its creation run the gamut.  As is often the 
case with a contentious issue, most evaluations focus on the negative results of the DNI 
rather than on any positive outcomes, and the issue remains as polarizing as ever.  As 
Turner observes, “The new way of doing intelligence business in the United States will 
continue to please neither proponents of centralization nor the advocates of sticking to the 
traditional way.”
169
  Furthermore, many of the criticisms presented in the initial 
discussions of the creation of the DNI are echoed to some degree in the years afterward, 
and many of the warnings and shortfalls experts portended have come to bear.  
McConnell contendss that the challenge the DNI faces is “to strike the right balance 
between centralized direction and decentralized execution so that the Office of the DNI 
does not just end up being another layer of bureaucracy on top of the existing 
structures.”
170
  In an article published a few years later in 2011, Harknett and Stever 
conclude, “the response to the complexity of the intelligence challenge is an incomplete 
process at this stage because of the complexity of the threat and the bureaucratic 
environment.”
171
  That conclusion appears baseless, however, since those factors 
mentioned are two of primary reasons underlying intelligence reform and discussion of 
creating a DNI in the first place.   
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DNI Turnover Rates 
One of the primary examples that critics of the DNI cite when denouncing this 
position is the high turnover rate.  As Harknett and Stever observe, “Four very 
accomplished officials with wide and successful national security experience have held 
the position in only six years.”  They go on to say that most of these officials believe that 
the position of DNI is essential, but “fundamentally hamstrung.”
172
  The National 
Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), the follow-on to the 9/11 Commission, expresses 
concern with this high turnover rate in their “Tenth Anniversary Report Card,” 
explaining, “Short tenures detract from the goals of building strong authority in the office 
and the confidence essential for the president to rely on the DNI as his chief intelligence 
advisor.”
173
  On a more optimistic note, however, James Clapper has occupied the 
position since 2010 and some are hopeful that his tenure will reverse the high turnover 
trend. 
 
Improvements in IC Analytical Efforts and Collaboration 
Despite discussion of negative evaluations of the DNI to date, there have been 
significant examples of positive outcomes associated with its creation.  The NSPG lists 
these successes in its “Report Card,” lauding the DNI for “increased information sharing, 
improved coordination among agencies, sharpened collection priorities . . . additional 
expertise into the analysis of intelligence, and further integrat[ing] the FBI into the 
overall intelligence effort.”
174
  Negroponte and Wittenstein stress the analytical success, 
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noting, “Given the DNI’s role as principal intelligence advisor to the President, one of the 
easiest things to influence was the quality of analysis served to the Commander-in-
Chief.”
175
   
One of the areas the DNI has been able to positively influence is increased 
analytic collaboration within the IC.  Tucker highlights the ability of the DNI to 
“reinvigorat[e] projects previously unable to gain community-wide support.”
176
  These 
projects include the creation of the Analyst Resource Catalog (ARC), an IC-wide 
directory of personnel listing their specialties and expertise, and A-Space, an online 
forum that allows analysts from various agencies to collaborate on common topics.  
Given Russell’s standpoint that “the lack of analytic expertise… undoubtedly contributed 
to the series of intelligence failures surrounding the pre-war assessment of Iraq’s WMD 
programs,” these tools will ideally improve analytic expertise to avoid such assessments 
in the future.
177
  McConnell similarly touts the DNI’s efforts to develop “virtual 
communities of analysts who can securely exchange ideas and expertise across 
organizational boundaries and harness cutting-edge technology to find, access and share 
information and analytic judgments.”
178
   
The DNI has also played a fundamental role is standardizing analytic methods and 
practices across the IC.  Tucker draws upon her firsthand experience leading the ODNI’s 
Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (OAIS) to discuss the efforts initiated by the 
DNI to improve analysis and analytic products.  Although the task of identifying IC-wide 
standards for analysis initially drew criticism and hostility from within some offices, 
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Tucker indicates that many people supported these efforts and the ODNI support for 
them.  Tucker also details the OAIS effort to require better sourcing information in 
analytic products to help avoid intelligence failures like the one that contributed to the 
Iraq WMD assessment that was largely based on unreliable single-source reporting.
179
      
The efforts to standardize analytic practices across the IC and the corresponding 
hesitation to do so among members of the community reflect the challenges the DNI still 
faces years after its creation.  McConnell emphasizes the DNI’s effort to minimize 
stovepiping, identified as one of the major contributors to the intelligence failures leading 
to 9/11, by replacing the “need to know” mantra with one stressing the “responsibility to 
provide.”
180
  As Tucker highlights, this change will only come about through widespread 
education across the IC, an effort undertaken by the DNI through creation of courses such 
as Analysis 101.  This course brings together new analysts from all of the agencies within 
the IC to improve critical thinking skills, learn and use ODNI-created IC Analytic 
Standards, and build their professional networks to increase collaboration.
181
  Along the 
same lines, McConnell also understands the need to address the identified gap between 
intelligence analysts and intelligence collectors, proposing, “The challenge now is to 
convince collectors that they are not data owners so much as data providers.”
182
  As the 
many proponents of IC reform at the DNI level recognize, these measures implemented at 
the DNI level are the first steps in addressing the cultural change that the 9/11 
Commission called for in order to avoid future intelligence failures. 
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The creation of the DNI also facilitated a change in the President’s Daily Brief 
(PDB), transforming this elite intelligence product from a CIA-centric publication into 
one encompassing intelligence from across the IC.  The DNI accomplished this by 
encouraging agencies across the IC to contribute to and make suggestions for 
improvement of the product.  Even in her less-than-enthusiastic evaluation of 
Negroponte’s performance in his first few months in office, Fesseden approves of the 
changes to the PDB, as well as the president’s daily threat report and National 
Intelligence Estimates, that allow for more “nuance and input” from all agencies within 
the IC.
183
  Negroponte and Wittenstein note that, in addition to increasing cooperation, 
the DNI was able to “reorient the PDB to include more strategic analysis and 
occasionally augment the briefing with ‘deep dives,’ in which top analyst would discuss 
their analysis with President Bush.”
184
  These changes were intended to partially address 
the shortcomings the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission identified regarding 
both collaboration and quality of analysis within the IC. 
 
Ongoing Reform and Outlook for the Future  
It has now been more than nine years since IRTPA’s implementation, and the 
debate over the performance of the DNI is still going strong.  Based on the assessments 
of intelligence experts, one can surmise that the DNI has not fully succeeded in 
responding to the factors that spurred its creation and rectifying the shortcomings of the 
IC.  The DNI envisioned by the 9/11 Commission was a cabinet-level official that would 
oversee the functions and performance of the IC in the same way that the Secretary of 
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Commerce is responsible for the Department of Commerce and the Secretary of State 
controls the affairs of the Department of State.  The DNI as it stands today, however, 
lacks the strong authorities, including control over the budget, to command the many 
disparate factions of the IC and mandate compliance with his directives.  Russell, a 
pessimist toward intelligence reform as outlined by the 9/11 Commission, demanded of 
both the DNI and the director of the CIA “strong, enlightened, aggressive, and innovative 
leadership that recognizes the profound need to change the business cultures and 
practices of analysis and spying.”
185
  This leadership and change is not altogether 
impossible, but even the most optimistic proponent of intelligence reform would likely 
agree that the IC has quite a bit of ground to cover before reaching that point.  
Its weak authority aside, the DNI is not likely to disappear any time soon, nor 
should it.  The individuals in this position have succeeded in increasing collaboration and 
strengthening analytic methods and standards across the IC, tasks that are crucial to 
reduce the likelihood of intelligence failures like those that preceded the 9/11 attacks.  
The DNI serves well in his capacity as national intelligence advisor to the president, and 
provides oversight on a number of programs designed to foster cooperation and IC 
collaboration and improve intelligence analysis.  He is in an optimal position to set and 
oversee national intelligence priorities and provide guidance for strategic intelligence 
planning, using various tools and opportunities.  Although the position is not necessarily 
a manifestation of the vision set forth by the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the 
DNI still has a valuable role in the IC in fulfilling these duties.  As this position becomes 
more and more entrenched in the national intelligence and political apparatus, it may well 
gain the ability to address more of the existing shortcomings of the IC. 
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As outlined above, evaluations of the performance of the DNI to date range from 
positive to negative, but some argue that it is still too early to conclude if this position is 
succeeding in rectifying the problems that prompted its creation. Harknett and Stever, 
while pessimistic about ability of the DNI to enact structural reform, are unsure if we 
have reached the zenith of intelligence reform yet, concluding that “whether this is the 
extent of the reform or whether a fuller reform is possible is the open question.”
186
  
McConnell also opines that the success of intelligence reform cannot yet be determined, 
and stating specifically, “it will take years to fully clarify and coordinate the DNI’s 
responsibilities and powers.”
187
  Thus, the debates over this position will likely endure, 
but only with time will a complete assessment be possible. 
 
Case Study:  Systems of Strategic Intelligence Planning Pre- and Post-IC Reform  
 Although scholars and defense experts have expressed myriad opinions on the 
performance of the DNI, determining how this position has specifically affected strategic 
intelligence planning demands a more thorough examination of its tools and 
methodologies, rather than simply observing the opinions of scholars on its performance 
to date.  In order to answer the initial research question of how the DNI affects strategic 
intelligence planning, this study will examine the development and content of the 
National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), as well as its role in the national 
intelligence process.  The paper will then compare the method for strategic intelligence 
planning prior to 9/11, as laid out in Presidential Decision Directive 35, with the creation 
of the NIPF in order to assess the differences.   
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 As scholar Paul L. Pillar aptly notes, “The U.S. Government has a long history, 
filled with an alphabet soup of documents and directives, of different formal mechanisms 
for determining which topics warrant the Intelligence Community’s attention.”
188
  This 
study, however, will focus primarily on comparing the NIPF with its immediate 
predecessor, the prioritization mechanism established within Presidential Decision 
Directive 35 (PDD 35) in 1995.  During the Cold War, policymakers had a clear, 
dominant intelligence priority in the Soviet Union, so they did not need to prioritize 
issues in the same manner that they did in the post-Cold War environment.  Comparing 
the NIPF and PDD 35 systems will best facilitate an analysis of contemporary 
intelligence prioritization mechanisms and allow for an assessment of contemporary 
strategic intelligence planning. 
 
The National Intelligence Priorities Framework 
 DCI George Tenet originally developed the NIPF in 2003, prior to the creation of 
the office of the DNI.  In 2007, however, by the authority of Intelligence Community 
Directive (ICD) 207, the NIPF became “the DNI’s sole mechanism for establishing 
national intelligence priorities.”
189
  As outlined in ICD 204, the NIPF consists of 
intelligence topics approved by the President, a process for assigning priorities to 
countries and non-state actors relevant to the approved intelligence topics, and a matrix 
showing those priorities.
190
  The matrix itself is classified, but a 2008 RAND Corporation 
Technical Report provides a more detailed definition of the product: 
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“Critical topic areas and challenges are organized into groupings, called 
bands, running from A to C, with A being a group of the most pressing and 
important challenges for the nation. Both nations and non-state actors are then 
extensively listed and their importance in relation to each banded topic areas 
evaluated and numerically weighted—a factor labeled “propensity.” A national 
intelligence priority scale is then established as the product of the two (band 
position times propensity). The highest intelligence priorities are then A-band 
issues associated with nations or nonstate actors with the greatest propensity to 
engage in that issue—to the potential detriment of the United States.”
191
 
Robert M. Clark cites Tom Fingar, the former National Intelligence Council Director, to 
clarify that that bands together include 32 intelligence topics, while the states and non-
state actors number about 220.  He also explains the system of determining prioritization 
in which cells are scored from zero to five, zero indicating that the topic will receive 
almost no coverage.  A score of one indicates the highest priority, and five indicates a 
low priority need, generally to support diplomatic responsibilities or areas with a 
“potential to flare up with significant implications for U.S. interests.”
192
  
In short, the NIPF effectively gives the DNI a formula for establishing which of 
the numerous strategic intelligence topics and focus areas are of the highest priority at 
any given time.   As Mark M. Lowenthal summarizes, the NIPF “allow[s] policy makers 
and intelligence officers to identify the countries of interest and the activities in that 
country that were of interest and then give them relative levels of importance as 
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  Prior to the creation of the NIPF, intelligence issues were 
generally addressed from either a geographic standpoint or a functional standpoint.  In 
very few cases, however, are policymakers concerned with all of the activities and issues 
in a particular country, so this method was not always the most efficient or 
comprehensive way of prioritizing issues.  The NIPF emerged as a tool to circumvent the 
need to choose between focusing on either geographic or functional issues.  Lowenthal 
explains that the NIPF addressed the problem “by relating each issue to the countries or 
non-state actors where it is important or, conversely, by showing which issues are 
relevant for a given country, because not every issue will matter for each country or non-
state actor.”
194
   
ICD 204 not only establishes the NIPF as the DNI’s tool for determining national 
intelligence priorities, it also dictates that the DNI and the IC will use the NIPF as a basis 
for allocating collection and analytical resources against these priorities.  The NIPF 
highlights intelligence issues that are of highest concern, thereby allowing policymakers 
to maximize the use of limited intelligence resources.  This is evident from the ODNI’s 
Fact Sheet detailing its achievements through 2011.  One of these specifically cited the 
NIPF as a crucial tool used by the DNI to develop a performance-based budget for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2010.  The NIPF allowed the DNI to “align collection and analytic resources 
across the IC to ensure that adequate resources are reaching the most complex national 
security challenges and emerging threats.”
195
  The mechanism is not only used to 
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determine individual FY budgets, but also considered in the five-year budget cycle.
196
  
This direct correlation between the NIPF and budgetary planning indicates the 
importance of the mechanism in policymakers’ decision-making processes.   
One of the reasons for the NIPF’s utility is the frequency with which it is 
reviewed, as well as the level at which this review occurs.  As outlined in ICD 207, “The 
NIPF is updated semi-annually, and ad hoc adjustments may be made to reflect changes 
in world events and policy priorities.”
197
  (President Obama changed the review 
frequency from semi-annually to annually or on an as needed basis; however, this does 
not undermine the importance of having an established review process.)  The level at 
which the NIPF is reviewed, at the National Security Council (NSC) Principals 
Committee (PC), as well as its final approval by the President, indicates that this is a 
mechanism with recognized authority.  The frequent review at high levels ensures that the 
integrity of the NIPF is sufficiently respected by the IC to allow the DNI to use it to set 
and direct intelligence priorities for the entire community. 
Despite its utility for establishing intelligence priorities, the NIPF is not entirely 
free from criticism.  Critiques often come from experts believing that the NIPF 
oversimplifies the process of prioritizing intelligence issues.  A 2008 RAND study 
acknowledges the NIPF’s utility, but warns that, “it also provides an incentive to reduce 
spending resources on all but the hottest current priorities, often at the expense of deeper 
assessments of longer-term challenges.”
198
  Similarly, Clark identifies the tendency of 
collectors and analysts to also focus their efforts on the highest priority topics, neglecting 
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those lower level issues, as a result of this system of prioritization.
199
  These downsides, 
however, are endemic in strategic intelligence rather than resultant from the prioritization 
mechanism. The inexact nature of intelligence and the constantly changing international 
system make it difficult, if not impossible, to fully cover every issue of potential concern 
to U.S. national security.  Thus, it is necessary to give more attention to those situations 
and issues that have the greatest potential to threaten U.S. national interests at the 
expense of losing fidelity on issues deemed less of a threat. 
Overall, the NIPF is a useful tool for prioritization of requirements.  Given the 
incredibly diverse range of intelligence issues across the IC, as well as the varying focus 
areas of individual players, not all stakeholders will agree on every priority.  Clark 
observes, however, that the NIPF is superior to its predecessors in that it allows for a 
better focus on issues across the national intelligence spectrum.  That is to say, previous 
methods for prioritizing intelligence requirements allowed for urgent military 
requirements to take precedence over less time-sensitive national requirements.  Since the 
National Security Council reviews priorities across the board under the NIPF, however, 
this is less of a concern today.  According to Clark’s analysis, “the result is a longer term 
perspective on intelligence needs than that associated with immediate military operations 
support.”
200
  This allows for more thorough strategic intelligence planning, because the 
DNI can maintain focus and resources on high-priority strategic issues even if a sudden 
military operation arises.  
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Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35) 
 Prior to the implementation of the NIPF for use in strategic intelligence planning, 
intelligence officials relied on the priority system established by President Bill Clinton 
under Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD 35).  PDD 35 was issued in 1995, at a 
time when U.S. defense policymakers were adjusting to a post-Cold War strategic 
environment, and it was designed to account for the shift of American defense policy 
away from the newly defunct Soviet Union.  U.S. policymakers now had to focus on 
areas that had been secondary concerns for decades, and they needed a system to rank 
those concerns commensurate with the threat they each posed. 
PDD 35 “set priorities for specific, named intelligence topics by assigning them to 
different ‘tiers.’”
201
  It was a marked departure from the previous prioritization policies 
because it was developed with buy-in from senior policymakers in the prioritization 
process, rather than simply leaving the determination of priorities to the DCI.  PDD-35 
prioritized topics according to the tier under which they fell, with higher-level tiers 
receiving greater attention.  More specifically, tier one focused on warning and crisis 
management, while tier four included countries that were of virtually no interest to the 
United States. 
Although the document itself is still classified, there is a general consensus about 
the priority issues included in PDD 35.  Frederick Hitz explains that it likely covered 
eight “holy” concerns: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, international criminal 
enterprise, international narcotics trafficking, economic issues, environmental issues, 
foreign scientific breakthroughs that might pose a threat to U.S. national security, and 
                                                        
201
 Pillar, “Adapting Intelligence,” 151. 
 97 
states of concern such as Russia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and China.
202
  Clark 
identifies similar topics, but specifies that PDD 35 “separated intelligence requirements 
into two broad categories: so-called hard targets (such as Libya, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and 
North Korea) and transnational issues (such as international crime, terrorism, and 
weapons proliferation).
203
  The highest priority within PDD 35, however, was the broad 
topic of Support to Military Operations (SMO).
204
 
 Despite some optimism at its inception, PDD 35 was by no means a perfect 
solution for prioritizing national intelligence requirements.  Creating this document 
required a great deal of effort among senior policymakers, who envisioned periodic 
revisions and updates to keep the document current.  Because of the extensive time and 
effort required to create the one document, however, PDD 35 was never revised as 
intended.  For this reason, the guiding document became increasingly antiquated as the 
years passed and the issues identified in the document became more or less threatening to 
the national interest of the United States.  This demonstrated a critical shortfall with this 
prioritization mechanism.  As Pillar observes, “PDD-35 continued to be invoked as a 
reference point for decisions on deploying intelligence resources, but each passing year 
increased the unease of using a document that everyone knew was gradually becoming 
outdated.”
205
   Additionally, PDD 35 did not adequately cover all of the intelligence 
topics and questions that concern Presidents, and it could not adequately justify the level 
of effort by the IC on certain topics.
206
  Although a good concept and arguably an 
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influence on the later development of the NIPF, PDD 35 was not robust enough to fulfill 
the needs of policymakers for prioritization and new identification of intelligence 
requirements. 
 
Prioritization in Future Strategic Intelligence Planning  
 Strategic intelligence planning is, by nature, a difficult and uncertain undertaking.  
Having a mechanism to prioritize strategic intelligence requirements has been and will 
continue to be crucial to policymakers’ abilities to allocate resources and direct coverage 
of the highest threats to American national interests.  Although both PDD 35 and the 
NIPF are just such mechanisms, there can be little argument that the NIPF is a better 
system than that implemented by PDD 35.  The differences are not only inherent in the 
structure and content of these mechanisms, but are also found in the differences in the 
policymakers responsible for their creation and management. 
One of the most important differences between the NIPF and PDD 35 is the 
review process for setting priorities.  Although the policymakers who created PDD 35 
intended for it to be a living document, revised as appropriate, there was no codified 
process for regular, periodic updates to the document.  The fact that it was issued at the 
presidential level conveyed authority, but made it exceedingly difficult to coordinate 
updates among stakeholders.  As a result, the priorities it outlined quickly became 
outdated, and strategic intelligence planning did not necessarily focus on the most current 
priorities.  Conversely, managing the NIPF falls squarely in the DNI’s lane of 
responsibility, so he is able to orchestrate its review at least once a year through an 
established process with buy-in at the NSC level.  Whereas the DCI was likely an 
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important player in the formulation of PDD-35, he was not the sole policymaker 
responsible for its creation and update.  Furthermore, his many duties (recalling that he 
was not only responsible for national intelligence, but that he was also the head of the 
CIA) probably prevented him from being able to focus enough attention and corral 
support and coordination among the members of the IC in order to effectively manage 
this document.  The DNI’s mandate to ensure collaboration and manage the IC naturally 
allows him to maintain the NIPF efficiently and accurately.  Thus, the NIPF better 
reflects the most current strategic situation and highest corresponding intelligence 
concerns of senior policymakers than did PDD-35. 
 Another key difference between PDD 35 and the NIPF is the method of 
prioritization of topics.  The use of the tier system in PDD 35 only constrained 
policymakers to ranking a certain number of specific issues, regardless of whether they 
were “hard targets” or transnational issues.  The matrix ranking system of the NIPF, 
however, allows for more granularity and nuance in prioritization, as policymakers 
prioritize the relationship between a transnational issue and a specific actor, rather than 
requiring them to choose one or the other.  As a result, policymakers, and in particular the 
DNI, can allocate resources to adequately cover the areas and issues that are of the 
highest concern, while simultaneously allowing for shifts in priorities that result from the 
ever-changing nature of the international system.   
 The NIPF is much more useful in strategic intelligence planning than was the 
PDD 35, which prioritized Support to Military Operations above all other issues.  
Constantly shifting focus and resources to support military operations compromised the 
IC’s ability to maintain persistent focus on long-term issues, which often comprise 
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strategic intelligence planning needs.   The construct of the NIPF allows for some shift in 
focus, particularly during review, but not at the expense of losing sight of long-term 
strategic objectives.  This allows the DNI to draw upon the established strategic priorities 
to determine resource allocation, without compromising the success of U.S. military 
operations or the ability of U.S. intelligence officials to quickly shift focus if an 
unexpected international incident arises that merits attention.  
 The NIPF appears to be an accepted system of prioritization for strategic 
intelligence planning, at least for the moment.  Politicians and policymakers have 
reputations for creating new systems and policies to replace those of their predecessors, 
so the fact that the NIPF has survived two presidential administrations is testament to its 
utility and worth, as well as the ability of the DNI to maintain and rely on it for strategic 
intelligence planning purposes. Lowenthal remarks that, “Long-time observers of the 
national security policy process found this carryover interesting, as each new 
administration, when it takes over the NSC system, renames various committees and 
memos, largely as a rebranding operation, to show there are new people in charge.”
207
   
The NIPF is likely to remain the DNI’s “sole mechanism for establishing national 
intelligence priorities,” due to its utility in strategic intelligence planning and its ability to 
reflect changing situations as a result of its established periodic review.  The ability of the 
DNI to procure stakeholder buy-in at such senior levels as the NSC and the President is 
crucial to flexibility and authority of this process.  This is not to say that the framework 
will foresee unanticipated challenges or imply that it has the ability to completely prevent 
strategic surprise.  Due to the inherent uncertainty in strategic intelligence, there will 
always be perceived “intelligence failures” that no system will be able to prevent, but the 
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DNI’s maintenance and use of the NIPF is currently the best resource available to help 
policymakers do their utmost to avoid these.  
 
Conclusion 
The U.S. intelligence reform that resulted from IRTPA and subsequent changing 
policies continues to incur questions and criticism, specifically about the authority and 
role of the DNI.  Many observe, correctly, that the DNI as it stands today does not play 
the role envisioned and recommended by the 9/11 Commission.  Further reforms or 
restructuring of authorities may come eventually, which would potentially strengthen the 
position of the DNI, but the position’s current status still has important implications for 
national security concerns and strategic intelligence planning.  This chapter has detailed 
some of the challenges that the DNI faces, as well as some of the accomplishments 
creation of this office have contributed to the IC to date, particularly in the area of 
strategic intelligence planning.  The DNI’s sole mechanism for establishing national 
intelligence priorities, the NIPF, continues to play an important part in setting national 
intelligence objectives, to which the nation’s intelligence activities are directly tied.  It 
allows the DNI to play a role in determining resource allocation and budgetary planning 
for many intelligence activities, although as mentioned, the DNI does not have budgetary 
control over the defense intelligence components.   
Through the direction and maintenance of the NIPF, the DNI has the ability to 
manage strategic intelligence priorities with buy-in from the most senior U.S. 
policymakers.  The regular revision of the NIPF allows the DNI to shift focus as 
necessary to emerging short-term issues, while still maintaining coverage on long-term 
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strategic priority areas, which were neglected in under previous prioritization 
mechanisms. Unlike its predecessors, the NIPF allows the DNI to prioritize the 
relationship between transnational issues and specific actors, rather than choosing one or 
the other.  This allows him to maximize resource allocation by reducing attention on 
certain issues in geographic areas of lesser priority.  Maximizing resource allocation is 
particularly important in today’s constrained fiscal environment, so the NIPF will likely 
continue to be a key mechanism in strategic intelligence planning in the years to come.  
Although noted that, like all strategic intelligence planning tools, the NIPF is not an 
infallible system, it appears to be a marked improvement over previous mechanisms, 




   
The twelve plus years that have passed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have 
marked a significant shift in U.S. strategic military planning and defense policy.  This 
paper has demonstrated three of the broad areas that have been affected: use of the 
military reserve component, defense budgets and resource allocation, and strategic 
intelligence planning.  Although many other factors in the defense realm have changed 
significantly since that fateful September day in 2011, these three areas are representative 
of the transition away from the conventional war paradigm that dominated the Cold War 
toward a global system in which asymmetric, irregular conflicts will characterize a 
significant portion of the threat environment in the foreseeable future.   
 This paper is not meant to serve as an exact, fail-safe formula for predicting how 
to counter future threats to American national interests.  As has occurred time and again 
throughout U.S. history, the likelihood remains that the next great threat will come from 
where least expected.  Given the continued superiority of American conventional forces, 
however, chances are good that future enemies will try to exploit American 
vulnerabilities in non-conventional areas. Defense planning will never be an exact 
science, but considering some of the themes this paper has covered can help American 
policymakers prepare to the best of their ability to counter obvious and perceived long-
term threats, such as terrorism, as well as those priority areas that could eventually 
develop into areas of concern.   
 The United States has been faced with the threat of terrorism for nearly two 
decades now, and has adapted accordingly to counter it.  With the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan over and drawing down, respectively, the American defense establishment 
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has again begun paying attention to other potential areas of concern.  That is to say, there 
is no doubt that terrorism will remain a high priority issue, and indeed, it is reflected in 
current defense strategic planning guidance, but policymakers are increasingly focusing 
on and preparing for other issues.  Two that dominate many strategic foreign and defense 
policy conversations include the “pivot toward Asia” and cyber threats.  Some of the 
lessons and conclusions presented in this paper can potentially be applied to emerging 
threats, as well as the strategic environment of the past decade plus. 
 As outlined above, the U.S. military now maintains an operational reserve 
component, rather than the strategic reserve envisioned in the Abrams Doctrine.  In the 
same way that many reservists have skills from their civilian jobs that can be applied to 
counterinsurgency missions, they may also have experiences upon which the military 
could draw for future missions and concentrations in cyber warfare or cyber defense.  
The world is becoming increasingly digitally focused, and job sectors in technology and 
computer information systems are growing.  Reservists come from a variety of 
backgrounds, so it is very likely that many have the skills and qualifications the military 
could use to grow or maintain its cyber capabilities.  Keeping in mind the negative 
consequences associated with overextending the reserve force learned during the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military should make a concerted effort to identify 
qualified individuals and encourage development of their skills in order to meet the 
demand set forth by cyber threats.   This is in line with recent defense policy emphasizing 
the need to adjust the balance between active and reserve components while also 
recruiting skilled personnel and retaining experienced personnel.
208
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 American defense budget planning and resource allocation will likely continue to 
move away from building and maintaining strictly conventional capabilities as well.  The 
recently released 2014 QDR continues to emphasize some of the primary themes of its 
immediate predecessor, but its focus is unmistakably adaptation to a constrained fiscal 
environment that includes sequestration and significantly reduced annual defense 
budgets.  The QDR embraces a three-pillar defense strategy to build the defense strategic 
guidance, aiming to protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and 
win decisively.
209
  Like its immediate predecessor, this strategy emphasizes international 
partnerships and security cooperation with allies in order to deter conflicts before they 
begin, but it does not compromise on assuring the continued dominance of U.S. defense 
capabilities.  The majority of recommendations are presented in terms of their overall 
financial benefit; for example, modernization of existing capabilities in order to increase 
efficiency and decrease the high levels of costly equipment and forces.  The 
recommendations and outlook of this QDR are in line with the conclusions presented in 
this paper: the shift from conventional to irregular warfare will decrease the costs of 
defense in the long run.  Because the United States is facing hard times financially at 
present, however this decrease in costs of defense will hopefully pay off sooner rather 
than later.  
 This paper has demonstrated the significant changes in the strategic intelligence 
planning paradigm in the United States in the years following the 9/11 attacks.  There is 
little doubt that the DNI as it stands today is not what the 9/11 Commission envisioned in 
its recommendations, but this office has enjoyed various successes, including increased 
collaboration within the IC, improved analytic capabilities, and more efficient 
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prioritization of intelligence needs.  Although the position remains the subject of debate 
among intelligence scholars and experts, the DNI will likely continue to influence U.S. 
intelligence activities and retain primary responsibility for ensuring coordination among 
members of the IC.   
The IC currently stands on the brink of another potential reform, but this time a 
perceived lack of effective intelligence oversight is the hot topic.  The information 
detailing NSA activities leaked by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, has 
garnered a great deal of media attention and caused many policymakers to call for 
investigation and reform.  The current DNI, James Clapper, unequivocally denounced 
Snowden’s actions, characterizing them as the most “massive and damaging theft of 
intelligence in our history.”
210
  President Obama has taken several measures to address 
the issues that came to light in the wake of the Snowden leaks, and he has delegated 
responsibility to DNI Clapper for many of them.  Some of these measures include 
mandating the DNI (in conjunction with the Attorney General) to conduct annual reviews 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decisions, to implement reforms of 
government communications intercept programs to address incidental collection on 
American and foreign citizens, and to extend protections intended to safeguard the 
privacy of Americans to overseas citizens as well.  These responsibilities indicate that the 
DNI does have real authority, albeit not budgetary, to implement policies that will 
significantly affect the activities of the entire IC and likely shift the course of U.S. 
strategic intelligence planning in the future. 
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The 9/11 attacks were one of the watershed moments in U.S. history that signaled 
the beginning of a new era, one that marked a decisive end to the Cold War strategic 
mindset.  The decade that followed the attack saw significant changes in U.S. defense; 
the reserve component, defense costs, and strategic intelligence planning detailed in this 
paper were just a few examples of these changes.  As history has repeatedly shown, there 
is no way to predict and counter every attack or affront, but understanding and improving 
its current defense posture will help the United States best protect its national interests 
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